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Modeling Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability: 
 
A Case Study of Pinellas County, Florida 
 
Raymond A. Miller Jr. 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Determining where people are most likely to suffer losses and have difficulty in 
evacuating from a hurricane is important to developing a hurricane response strategy. 
This thesis proposes a methodology for modeling and assessing evacuation vulnerability 
to a specific hurricane and applies this method to study Pinellas County, Florida.  
The vulnerability of Pinellas County to evacuation problems and the degree of 
loss that may be suffered from a hurricane is quantified in the Hurricane Evacuation 
Vulnerability Index. This index is the sum of three indices that represent social, 
transportation, and geophysical aspects of hazards research. Social vulnerability is 
assessed with an existing social vulnerability model that uses census data to locate areas 
where people will have difficulty evacuating based on demographic variables. Areas 
where people are vulnerable to traffic problems due to the condition of the evacuation 
routes are identified with a model developed using GIS. The degree of damage these 
areas may suffer from a specific hurricane is modeled using a tightly coupled GIS 
program, HAZUS-MH. These loss estimates are used to identify areas where evacuation 
may be necessary. The Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index is mapped to show the 
  viii 
areas that are most vulnerable to evacuation problems and may suffer losses to the built 
environment and subsequent human displacement. 
The Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index is a valuable tool for emergency 
planning. The results are useful in allocating and directing resources to facilitate the 
evacuation of vulnerable areas. Emergency management officials can prepare evacuation 
plans based on the modeled results. Traffic management strategies can be implemented to 
reduce traffic congestion along evacuation routes. Transportation resources, such as 
buses, can be directed to areas where people do not have the resources to evacuate. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Introduction 
In 2005, two major U.S. cities, New Orleans and Houston each experienced a 
major hurricane evacuation in response to Hurricane Katrina and Rita, respectively. In 
New Orleans, many people, especially the poor, were unable to evacuate. These people 
did not have the means to leave New Orleans and the government was not able to 
adequately respond to their needs. The consequent suffering after Hurricane Katrina 
impacted the Gulf Coast prompted criticism of the slow response from all levels of 
government.  
A month after Hurricane Katrina made landfall on Louisiana, Hurricane Rita was 
projected to make landfall on Texas. The lessons learned from the New Orleans 
evacuation led to a major evacuation of Houston, Texas. People who were unable to 
evacuate by their own means were transported out by bus. However, a major problem in 
the evacuation which occurred in both Houston and New Orleans was heavy traffic 
congestion. The evacuation strategies of each of these cities did not prevent the highways 
from being clogged with traffic. Consequently, especially in Houston, some people chose 
to stay home, placing them at greater risk to the hurricane. 
So, what if one of these hurricanes had impacted Florida, specifically Tampa 
Bay? In 2004, people throughout Florida experienced at least one of four major 
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hurricanes, and some certainly suffered more than others. Two of these hurricanes, 
Charley and Ivan, threatened to make landfall on the Tampa Bay metropolitan area. 
Fortunately for Tampa Bay, these hurricanes made landfall elsewhere. However, the 
hurricane seasons of 2004 and 2005 have made evacuation a concern in the Tampa Bay 
area, especially in Pinellas County, Florida. As was witnessed in the events of Hurricane 
Katrina and Hurricane Rita, ability to evacuate affects how vulnerable they are to 
hurricanes. 
This thesis provides a methodology for modeling hurricane evacuation 
vulnerability to identify locations within Pinellas County where people are vulnerable 
during evacuation from a hurricane. This model identifies areas where people have 
special evacuation needs, and identifies areas where people are most vulnerable to traffic 
problems due to the condition of the evacuation routes. This methodology also estimates 
the degree of structural loss and human displacement that will likely occur from a 
hurricane in order to assess the vulnerability of Pinellas County’s built environment. The 
results of this methodology are used to determine the locations of those most vulnerable 
to evacuation problems, and where evacuation orders should be directed in context to a 
specific hurricane, based on potential losses. 
This methodology combines models pertaining to three aspects of evacuation: 
social vulnerability, transportation, and geophysical impact, to answer the following 
research questions: 
1. Where in Pinellas County are people vulnerable to hurricane evacuation 
problems? 
2. What are the factors that make people vulnerable in an evacuation? 
3. How vulnerable are people to suffering losses from hurricanes? 
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Chapter Organization 
The second chapter of this thesis is a literature review that develops the 
theoretical framework for this research. The first section describes Pinellas County and 
its hurricane history. The second section describes Emergency management principles, 
especially hazard response. The third section describes the problems in assessing social 
groups that are vulnerable to natural hazards. This section includes the theoretical 
framework of social vulnerability in context to modeling this phenomenon. The fourth 
section explains the limitations of loss modeling and the role of GIS. The fifth section 
describes the HAZUS-MH model developed by the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency. The sixth section describes the role of evacuation in emergency response and the 
different studies of evacuation.  
 The third chapter describes the methodology used for assessing hurricane 
evacuation vulnerability of Pinellas County. The three models that are used to calculate 
indices that address the social, transportation, and geophysical aspects of this research are 
described. The results of these three indices are compiled into an index of hurricane 
evacuation vulnerability. 
 The fourth chapter discusses the results of the indices. The affect of different 
hurricane scenarios on the model results is examined. Then, the affect weighting 
coefficients have on the model results is examined. Finally, the findings of this research 
are discussed. 
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 The fifth chapter concludes this thesis. The findings of this research are reviewed. 
The value of the model to emergency management is described. Finally, issues for future 
work are presented.  
 
 
 
  5 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
Pinellas County’s Hurricane History 
 Pinellas County is a prime example of how, regardless of the hazards, people will 
put themselves in harm’s way by living in hazardous places. Pinellas County is 
vulnerable to hurricanes because of its population and its location. It is the most densely 
populated county in Florida, with 3,291 people per square mile (Pinellas County 
Socioeconomic Report 2004). This peninsular county is located on the west coast of 
Florida bordering Tampa Bay and the Gulf of Mexico, as shown in Figure 2.1. The 
county has a limited number of routes that can be used for a hurricane evacuation. People 
still choose to live in this county, perhaps because there may be an acceptable level of 
risk from hurricanes. A major hurricane has never been recorded to have made landfall 
on Pinellas County in the 154 years of record. The desire to live in Pinellas County is the 
result of people wanting to live in the sun and look out into the ocean; realtors want to 
make money, and the local government wants more tax dollars (Dean 1999). 
Evacuation is a critical response component of Pinellas County’s emergency 
operations (PLMS 2003). This is important in evacuation analyses because the chosen 
strategy will either increase or decrease the risk of injury or death from a hurricane. 
People may perceive evacuating is too difficult and may choose to ride out a hurricane. 
People may also believe that they are safe because “hurricanes never hit here.”   
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The population of Pinellas County would have to evacuate the majority of its 
population via three causeways crossing Tampa Bay, as shown in Figure 2.1. These 
evacuation routes are shared by Hillsborough County. People could evacuate north into 
Pasco County, but this county is also along the coast so people would still be at risk. 
Evacuation over the Sunshine Skyway Bridge south into Manatee County would only be 
possible if the call to evacuate were made very early. This bridge is shut down once 
winds reach 40 mph.  
Figure 2.1 Pinellas County Hurricane Evacuation Routes 
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The last hurricane to make landfall at Pinellas County occurred in 1921. This era 
was the beginning of the northern migration to Florida from northern states to escape the 
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harsh northern winters. Vacationers were nicknamed “Tin Can Tourists” because of the 
canned foods they packed during there migration via automobile (Barnes 1998, 103). 
 On October 21, 1921 a category two hurricane made landfall on Tarpon Springs. 
The U.S. Weather Bureau described the storm:  
“Great damage resulted in Tampa and adjacent sections 
from the combined effects or high winds and storm tides 
[surge]. The tide at Tampa was 10.5 feet, the highest since 
1848. Eggmond [sic] and Sanibel Island were practically 
covered by water.” (Williams 2002) 
 
According to Barnes (1998) the storm surge was the most damaging effect from 
the 1921 storm. The seawall along Bayshore Boulevard in Tampa was inundated by 
storm surge. The four piers of downtown St. Petersburg were destroyed. Hotels, such as 
The St. Petersburg Beach Hotel and Casino at Blind Pass, were damaged by the wind and 
waves. The hurricane knocked out power, causing the St. Pete Times newspaper to work 
under lanterns. Otis Beard, the owner of a motorcycle shop, built a makeshift generator 
from a motorcycle to operate their printing machine. The edition, known as “The 
Motorcycle Extra,” was the first communication of the hurricane. An estimated eight 
people died during this hurricane, and economic losses were close to three million dollars 
(Barnes 1998). 
 The growth that has occurred in Pinellas County both in population and in 
economics has not been hindered by hurricanes. According to the 2000 U.S. Census, the 
population of the county was 921,482 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2005, Pinellas County 
Socioeconomic Report 2004). The county is the most densely populated in the state with 
3,291 people per square mile as of 2000 (Pinellas County Socioeconomic Report 2004). 
The county witnessed its greatest period of growth between 1980 and 1990 when the 
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population increased almost forty percent, adding over 200,000 people (Pinellas County 
Socioeconomic Report 2004). The eighties had little hurricane activity during this 
population boom; it was not until 1990 that Tropical Storm Marco struck Pinellas County 
(Barnes 1998; Williams 2002). This population is vulnerable to hurricanes not only 
because there are more people and buildings at risk but also for perception reasons. When 
people have not experienced a hurricane or cannot vividly remember one, people may put 
themselves in harm’s way unintentionally.  
 An increase in the number of buildings and in property values is a result of the 
increase in population (Elsner and Kara 1999, 407). Losses from hurricanes will increase 
as long as property values increase. Hence, the cost of mitigating the impact of hurricanes 
will escalate along with the population. This also increases problems in the disaster 
insurance sector. According to Changnon et al. (1997), $400 million of the $40 billion in 
losses from Hurricane Andrew and Hurricane Iniki (Pacific Basin) were not reimbursed. 
The vulnerability of the Tampa Bay area to hurricanes has been reaffirmed since 
the late 1990’s. Hurricane Georges, September 1998, caused a mandatory evacuation of 
Pinellas County in coastal areas. Hurricane Gordon, September 2000, closed the 
Courtney Campbell Parkway, an evacuation route, for four hours. While none of the “Big 
Four” hurricanes (Charley, Frances, Ivan, Jeanne) made landfall on Tampa Bay in 2004, 
the intensity of Hurricane Frances and Jeanne were certainly felt as these storms carved 
swaths through the area. Also, while the immediate meteorological effects of Hurricane 
Ivan and Charley did not impact the area, preparing for these storms was still necessary.  
Assessing the geophysical risk of Pinellas County to hurricanes is prone to error 
because of the lack of historical data. The instance of a major hurricane making landfall 
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on Pinellas County is low based on historical records. However, these records are limited. 
Nevertheless, return periods are used to measure frequencies of hazards such as floods 
and storms. A return period indicates the likelihood of an event occurring based on a 
number of years of record. For example, a 100-year hurricane for an area of study does 
not mean that a hurricane of a particular magnitude will occur only once in 100 years. A 
100-year hurricane is simply an estimate of the potential number of landfalls on an area 
over a period of time. If an area experienced a hurricane ten times over a period of one 
hundred years then the probability of occurrence of a hurricane is ten percent in any 
given year; the return period would be ten years. Elsner and Kara (1999, 294) calculated 
the return period of a hurricane making landfall on Pinellas County as 12.1 years, and the 
return period for major hurricanes (category 3 or higher) is 97 years. 
Some may argue that the location of Tampa Bay prevents it from being hit by a 
major hurricane because the peninsula of Florida will prevent such a powerful storm from 
hitting the bay area. However we saw in Hurricane Charley that a hurricane of lesser 
intensity can enter the Gulf of Mexico and then increase in magnitude. Charley, once in 
the Gulf of Mexico off the coast of south Florida, increased from a category two storm to 
a category four storm in only three hours. Based on this, it is necessary to make early 
preparations and proceed with response measures.  
Response and recovery are inhibited by the geography of Pinellas County. The 
limited evacuation routes and dense population make evacuation difficult. According to 
the Pinellas Local Mitigation Strategy (PLMS 2003), an estimated 676,250 residents will 
have to evacuate for a worst-case hurricane scenario. The PLMS also has approximately 
2,000 people registered in the Special Needs Program who have limited means of 
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evacuating themselves. The limited number of evacuation routes makes clearing this 
peninsular county a procedure that requires comprehensive planning. This county needs a 
considerable amount of time to evacuate.  
The potential to over warn can lead to a cynical public if hurricanes do not strike 
and people are called to evacuate numerous times. It is estimated that in urban areas 
‘false alarms’ can cost more than $100,000 per mile (Elsner and Kara 1999). However, 
because forecasting still has a high degree of error, pinpointing where to evacuate and 
waiting to the last minute will lead to catastrophe if the hurricane changes course. This 
was seen with Hurricane Charley. The storm was projected at 11:00 am August 13, 2004 
to make landfall on Tampa Bay, but three hours later Charley was projected to make 
landfall on Port Charlotte approximately 100 miles south of Tampa.  
Cova and Conger (2004) argued that it is difficult to quantify the effects of 
hurricane winds on transportation systems because of the lack of data available. Wind can 
knock down features such as trees or telephone poles creating obstructions. Hurricane 
winds can blow a vehicle off a road. The Skyway Bridge, for example, is closed when 
wind speeds exceed 40 mph. The closure of elevated roads, particularly Tampa Bay 
bridges, therefore creates evacuation problems. Certainly there is a need to evacuate 
Pinellas County early especially with the unpredictability of hurricanes.  
Estimations of the resources that need to be allocated to respond to and recover 
from a hurricane are also difficult because of this lack of historical data (Waugh 1998, 
113). Pinellas County has not had to recover from a major hurricane since the Tampa Bay 
area has developed into a metropolis. Its emergency response strategy is subject to 
models and comparisons with other areas that have suffered from a hurricane. 
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The social groups that are most vulnerable need to be given careful consideration. 
Pinellas County’s senior citizen population, 22.5 percent as of 2004, is considerably 
higher than that of the nation, 12.4 percent, and even Florida, 17.6 percent. The migration 
of seniors from the northern U.S. increases the vulnerability of Pinellas County because 
these people are not usually experienced in hurricanes and may not handle its stresses the 
way others can.  
Another social group that is important in terms of vulnerability is the non-senior 
population that has moved to Pinellas County from another state. According to the 
Pinellas County Socioeconomic Report (June 2004, 24) over 60 percent of the people that 
have migrated to Pinellas County are from a state other than Florida. These people may 
not have experience in coping with hurricanes which may make them more vulnerable.  
 
Hazard Response  
The emergency management community has adopted a proactive approach to 
hazards response (Mileti 1999; Cutter 2001; Wisner et al. 2004). Instead of reacting to 
disasters, measures are taken to reduce the size of a disaster before it occurs. This 
approach lies in the understanding that disasters are a result of humans interacting with 
natural phenomenon that are hazardous to them. Natural hazards such as hurricanes 
cannot be controlled- we know this because of course it is in our nature to try. The 
National Hurricane Center created Project Stormfury (1961-1983) to develop ways that a 
hurricane could be weakened or destroyed (Sheets 2001, 150). The project was a failure. 
Therefore, it is important to make society less vulnerable to hurricanes rather than to 
control the hurricane.  
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Reducing vulnerability is an important concept in hazard response. Burton et al. 
(1993) developed a model which can be considered as a theoretical framework for 
vulnerability reduction. The model contains five parts (Mileti 1999, 22):  
(1) Assess hazard vulnerability. 
(2) Examine possible adjustments. 
(3) Determine the human perception and estimation of the hazard. 
(4) Analyze the decision making process. 
(5) Identify the best adjustments, given social restraints, and evaluate their  
                  effectiveness. 
 
This model is the foundation of Comprehensive Emergency Management which 
contains four parts: Preparation, Response, Recovery, and Mitigation.   
Pinellas County needs to prepare for a hurricane throughout the year, not just 
during hurricane season. Responsible land use planning and the implementation and 
enforcement of building codes can minimize the effects of a hurricane on the built 
environment. Financial options to aid in recovery from a hurricane should also be clearly 
explained to reduce the confusion people suffer from in trying to get money to repair 
their homes. People can prepare their households by stocking up supplies well before a 
hurricane strikes. Supply checklists that are made available in the local newspaper can be 
used to assure that people have all of the essential supplies to prepare for and live through 
a hurricane. The media also supplies important response information, such as evacuation 
routes and hurricane shelters.  
The development and continued maintenance of the hurricane response strategy 
by the Pinellas County Emergency Management agency is important to evacuation. A 
strategy must not only address people living in high risk areas, but also must efficiently 
evacuate these people. Therefore to develop the most efficient strategy, high risk areas 
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must be identified. The ability of people to evacuate, and the adequacy of the roadways 
people will use to evacuate, must be assessed. 
In the event that a hurricane does make landfall on Pinellas County, the recovery 
strategy must include a reentry strategy for evacuees in addition to tasks such as debris 
removal, utility and infrastructure repair, medical treatment, etc. A reentry strategy is 
important in reducing traffic congestion when evacuees return home. The recovery 
strategy must also be continually updated, especially after problems in the strategy are 
discovered after a hurricane impacts Pinellas County.  
Evaluating the response and recovery strategies and preparing for hurricanes are 
all part of hazard mitigation. Other parts of hazard mitigation include the development 
and implementation of building codes to reduce damages to structures and better land use 
planning to prevent the development in high risk areas. However, in context in coastal 
development, this does not always occur. Again, mitigation must also be continually 
updated as problems with emergency management plans are discovered. 
An example of how comprehensive emergency management saves lives can be 
found in Cuba (Wisner et al. 2004, 267). This country has a long history of hurricanes 
that have killed thousands of people. However, Cuba only suffered 5 deaths from 
Hurricane Michelle in 2001 as a result of timely evacuation. Approximately 700,000 
people were evacuated from a population of 11 million. This was possible due to the first 
time use of a CEM plan in Cuba.  
 
 
 
  14 
Vulnerability 
 Society views natural hazards as the physical cause of loss to human 
achievements (Wisner et al. 2004, 6). However, looking at hazards at a broader scale, 
disasters can be viewed as the result of a natural hazard impacting humans, the triggering 
of a natural event that disrupts people’s lives. Mileti (1999) organizes the factors that lead 
to disasters into three categories; geophysical influences, social systems, and hazards 
resulting from the built environment.  
The geophysical vulnerability of a community is determined by the number and 
type of geophysical events to which a community is exposed. Measurement of hurricane 
risk is necessary to determine vulnerability. Tobin and Montz (1997, 52) list shared 
components of hazards that control geophysical vulnerability.  
• Physical mechanism: magnitude, duration, spatial extent 
• Temporal distribution: frequency, seasonality, diurnal patterns 
• Spatial distribution: geographic location 
• Countdown interval: rapidity of commencement, preparation time, speed of 
onset 
 
Community response and recovery differs among social groups. Wisner et al. 
(2004) defines social vulnerability as “the characteristics of a person or group and their 
situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the 
impact of a natural hazard.” The social structure of a community, i.e. economic strength 
and demographic composition, will help determine its degree of social vulnerability to 
hazards.  
Research into the recovery of different social groups has shown that the poor, 
including children, the elderly, women, and racial minorities, do not recover as well as 
non-poor whites (Cutter 1996). These groups may not only have financial difficulties. 
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Cutting through red tape in dealing with the government is also more difficult for these 
groups (Mileti 1999, 123). However, income status is arguably the most significant of 
these factors. Wisner et al. (2004, 12-13) identifies three differences between high and 
low income social groups: 
1. High income social groups can afford the design engineering of their 
homes to sustain the effects of a hazard. 
2. High income social groups may choose to live in an area such as the coast, 
while the poor may be forced to live in hazardous area like a floodplain 
because that is all they can afford. 
3. High income social groups have insurance and financial reserves to 
recover, and can relocate if needed. 
 
Social vulnerability is not limited to disadvantaged social groups. The increase in 
population density of an area can increase the vulnerability of a community because the 
resources needed to cope with a hazard are stressed. We see population outgrow 
infrastructure everyday when we drive to work or school, and more and more children 
enter schools with already overcrowded classrooms. Another vulnerable social group 
identified by Mileti (1999) that is on the rise is unmarried people who live alone and have 
children. According to the U.S. Census, over the past thirty years, the percentage of 
household, “married with children” has declined from 40 percent in 1970 to 24 percent in 
2000. The increase of single parents in U.S. society can hinder recovery from an event as 
these people may not have the financial resources to recover as quickly as couples (Mileti 
1999, 121). 
The difficulty in evacuating and sheltering these social groups also adds to their 
vulnerability. They may not have their own means to evacuate themselves (Lindell and 
Perry, 1992), making them less inclined to evacuate. It is less likely that the poor have 
their own vehicles; those that do have vehicles may have to overcrowd their automobiles 
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to help friends, neighbors, etc. This will put them at risk of having a car accident when 
evacuating. Leaving their possessions behind when evacuated by public transportation 
adds to the problem. Once evacuated, these groups may not even have a place to go. They 
may need to go to a public shelter because they do not have friends or family elsewhere 
or cannot afford a hotel. The degree of access people have to evacuation routes will either 
attenuate or intensify their risk. Increased loads on the roadways of course lead to 
accidents and traffic congestion.  If people have options in the routes they can take to flee 
the area, then there may be less stress than people with only one way out.  
The economic impact of a disaster will be largely, but not solely, determined on 
the vulnerability of the built environment. Building and infrastructure damage is the 
largest component of direct economic losses (Mileti 1999). Communities that plan 
development and mitigate building standards in consideration of hazards will be less 
vulnerable than a community that does not. It may be self evident that building standards 
must also be enforced by the government. It was found that only ten percent of the homes 
built before 1980 were uninhabitable after Hurricane Andrew struck south Florida in 
1992, while 33 percent were damaged that were built after 1980 (Mileti, 1999, 131;  
Miami Herald. Special Report: What went wrong? Dec. 20, 1992). This disparity in 
damages is attributed to lax building code enforcement in the 1980’s due to pressures 
from builders to cut costs. An example of this is the use of asphalt shingles on roofs that 
can only withstand sustained winds of 63 mph. In addition, some roofs were constructed 
using waferboard (constructed of glued woodchips) rather than plywood (Miletti 1999, 
131). 
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 In context to the Tampa Bay area, the number of manufactured homes also 
presents a problem. As of 2003, there were approximately 56,000 mobile homes in 
Pinellas County (PLMS, 2003, 1:14). Hurricane straps may not suffice in protecting these 
homes in the event of a major hurricane and damages, as we saw in the case of Hurricane 
Charley, will be immense (Tobin et al. 2005). These mobile homes are also typically 
inhabited by vulnerable social groups.  
  
Vulnerability Modeling 
 To model the vulnerability of a community it is necessary to assess the risk of a 
natural hazard. Combining models of social vulnerability and geophysical risk is a way to 
improve risk assessment and analyze mitigation strategies as recommended by the 
National Resource Council’s Board on Natural Disasters (Cutter 2001 and BOND 1999). 
Assessing risk is problematic because the concept of risk means different things to 
different people (Slovic 1987, 283). Smith (1996, 5) defines risk as, 
“the actual exposure of something of human value to a 
hazard and is often regarded as the combination of 
probability and loss.” 
 
The assessment of natural hazard risk, particularly hurricanes, is performed 
empirically using stochastic and meteorological models. There are numerous hurricane 
models used for forecasting of tracks and estimating impacts. The tracks of hurricanes 
can be forecasted with a variety of models such as the CLIPER model, developed in 
1972, or the most advanced currently used model, the “Geophysical Fluid Dynamics 
Laboratory (GFDL),” (Sheets 2001, 207). The effects of hurricanes such as storm surge 
can be estimated using the Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges (SLOSH) model developed 
  18 
by the National Hurricane Center (NOAA, 2005).  However, standardized models of 
social vulnerability do not currently exist. 
Modeling social vulnerability is important because it enables us to improve the 
health of a community, thereby reducing the impacts of a disaster. Mileti (1999) lists 
themes that will improve community health: 
1. Maintain and, if possible, enhance environmental quality. 
2. Maintain and, if possible, enhance people’s quality of life. 
3. Foster local resiliency and responsibility for disasters. 
4. Recognize that sustainable, vital local economies are essential. 
5. Identify and ensure intra- and intergenerational equity. 
6. Adopt a consensus-building approach, starting at the local level.  
 
 The reason there is a lack of satisfactory social vulnerability models is because 
the array of social factors that make a community vulnerable are not fully known. 
Lindsay (2003) argues that the establishment of a hierarchy of these social factors is also 
disputable. While past disasters such as Hurricane Andrew proved that certain groups had 
difficulty in recovery, the factors that determine social vulnerability are more complex 
than simply income level, age, and gender. Furthermore, quantifying social vulnerability 
and classifying people based on their degree of vulnerability is not something we can do 
the way hurricanes are classified with the Saffir-Simpson scale.  
 Lindsay (2003) argues that the same factors that cause people to be vulnerable to 
hazards can be found in health studies. Much like hazards studies, health has evolved 
from a healing approach to a concept of wellness. The World Health Organization states 
that “socioeconomic conditions and the social and physical environments are key in 
determining people’s health and well being” (Zollner and Lessof, 1998, 2; Lindsay 2003, 
293). Health Canada (1996) lists income and social status; social support networks; 
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education; employment and working conditions; social environments; physical 
environments; biology and genetic empowerment; personal health practices and coping 
skills; health child development and child services; gender; culture; education.  
 While the debate over the socioeconomic characteristics that should be considered 
in modeling will continue, it is important to consider the theoretical framework in order 
to develop such a model. Wisner et al. (2004) proposed two models, The Disaster 
Pressure and Release Model (PAR), and the Access Model.  
 Wisner et al. (2004, 49) argued that the risk of a disaster is a compound function 
of the natural hazard and the number of people, characterized by their varying degrees of 
vulnerability to that specific hazard, who occupy the space and time of exposure to that 
hazard event. Simply, risk can be considered as the product of a hazard and vulnerability. 
The PAR model identifies people that are under “pressure,” for example poor people. 
Releasing the pressure that these people are under will in turn lessen the impact of a 
disaster. This model is linked with the Access Model. The Access model considers the 
resources people have to cope with a disaster. In context to hurricane evacuation, 
identifying populations under pressure and releasing this pressure can be conducted by 
assessing the ability of people to evacuate. For example, people with automobiles or 
people living in areas with evacuation route options will be under less pressure when 
evacuating. 
 Tobin et al. (2005) assessed the vulnerability of Florida counties and found that 
the proportion of vulnerable people has increased in the past thirty years. This increase is 
not necessarily due to the increase in population, but because particular social groups that 
are vulnerable have grown. This is significant because emergency management must 
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evaluate operations over time and determine if its planning is suitable to respond to these 
vulnerable populations. As the population of Pinellas County increases, so does 
vulnerability (Chakraborty et al. 2005). It is important to determine if the increase in 
population is of groups that are socially vulnerable. Also more people mean more 
problems in evacuations, and population seems to always outgrow infrastructure. Past 
disasters such as Hurricane Hugo in 1999 proved that these vulnerable populations were 
not considered in recovery efforts (Wisner et al. 2004, Miller and Simile 1992). 
  
Loss Modeling 
Measuring disaster loss is a difficult undertaking. While some estimates such as 
deaths and the number of buildings damaged may appear to be straight forward, past 
events such as Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the 1906 San Francisco earthquake proved 
otherwise. These estimates are difficult because not only is the process of counting deaths 
and destroyed buildings difficult urban areas, but these estimations can lead to negative 
perceptions of not only the affected area but also the government and its response efforts. 
According to Comerio (1998, 31), the actual number of deaths resulting from the “Great 
Earthquake of 1906” in San Francisco was closer to 3,000 rather than the officially 
reported 498, but the government did not want to shock insurance companies in the 
eastern U.S. looking to expand to the west coast and also did not want to discourage 
people from moving out west.  
Damages from Hurricane Andrew were estimated at $25 billion; however, the 
number of buildings destroyed was not immediately known because the destruction was 
so severe. Early estimates were performed by estimating damage for areas with particular 
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building densities (Comerio 1998, 33). Comparative estimates were then performed based 
on these densities.  
 The use of computer models for analyzing and simulating hurricanes range in 
applications from meteorological to structural engineering. There are a variety of 
forecasting models used to determine the potential track of a hurricane. The results of 
such models are often displayed together on a map, commonly referred to by the media as 
a ‘spaghetti model,’ to display the different modeled tracks a hurricane may follow.     
The effects of a hurricane, such as storm surge, are also modeled. The Sea, Lake, 
and Overland Surges (SLOSH) model quantifies coastal flooding from hurricanes. Much 
of the damage resulting from hurricanes results from storm surge. A category 5 hurricane 
will have a storm surge that is in excess of 5 meters causing catastrophic damage to all 
structures within 150 meters of the coast (Elsner 1999, 22). Therefore, this model is 
useful because it helps emergency planners calculate where evacuation may be needed in 
the event of a hurricane. However, damage to infrastructure and buildings from saltwater 
can occur for an indefinite amount of time, making damage estimates from storm surge 
impossible (Wisner et al. 2004, 246 and Campbell 1984). 
There is great breadth in the modeling of geophysical components of a hurricane. 
Estimating loss from hurricanes, however, is in its infancy. Models can use either 
deductive or inductive approaches in modeling hazards (Cova and Conger 2004). 
Deductive approaches model the physical nature of hurricanes to estimate losses. For 
example, estimating maximum sustained winds estimated at a census tract, one can 
determine the degree of building damage. An inductive study considers past observations 
and estimates loss based on the characteristics of past studies. Loss estimations include 
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calculating direct economic loss, such as building damage; indirect economic loss, 
employment or revenue; and human losses. It was found that loss was severely 
underestimated in post disaster surveys of Hurricane Andrew (Wisner et al. 2004).                
            Pielke (1997) identifies four challenges for identifying and quantifying losses: 
production of multiple-order impacts; direct and indirect costs; difficulty in quantifying 
intangibles; and tallying up losses versus benefits. An even more perplexing problem in 
loss estimation is human and cultural loss. Placing a value on human life brings about 
ethical and equality issues (Cutter 2001). 
Pinellas County currently uses The Arbiter of Storms (TAOS) model to assess 
potential damages to communities (PLMS 2003). The TAOS model simulates the effects 
of a hurricane (wind, waves, translation speed, storm surge, and inland flooding from 
rainfall) to assess damages to communities. It produces structural damage estimates as 
well as debris generation. This model does have drawbacks, such as the inability to 
estimate human displacement, and the inability to estimate loss from specific hurricanes 
in real time.  
Most important in loss modeling is the ability to simulate a hurricane’s effects in 
order to estimate damages. As the knowledge of hurricanes continues to grow through 
research and technological advancements, the accuracy of loss models needs to improve. 
 Watson et al. (2004) examined the “state of the art” of hurricane loss modeling in 
a review of nine wind models, four surface friction models, and nine damage models 
created by various agencies in the engineering, meteorology, and insurance disciplines. It 
is important to note that many of these models are proprietary and the inner workings of 
the models are generally trade secrets to the agencies producing them. Therefore analysis 
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of the accuracy of these models is limited to comparative studies of models with observed 
hurricane losses. These models are embedded with models for wind, surface roughness, 
and damage coefficients to estimate losses. The refinement of these models includes 
developing new ways of measuring surface roughness using land use, more accurate 
elevation models, as well as configuring damage coefficients for individual building 
types such as wood or concrete. While there is merit in enhancing these models Watson 
et al. (2004) argued that the greatest emphasis of future research should be placed on the 
enhancement of the meteorological understandings of hurricanes. Parametric wind 
models, such as the model used in the TAOS model, need more accurate hurricane wind 
data than just wind speed, eye radii, pressure, and translation speed. Watson et al. (2004) 
compared the results of hurricane loss models applied to North Carolina and found that 
surface roughness had negligible results between models. The reason for this result may 
be because different storms deposit peak winds on a given location from different 
directions, thus potentially averaging out the impact of surface friction over many storms 
(Watson 2004, 1723-1724). Enhancing the damage coefficients will only be worthwhile 
once the understanding of hurricane force winds improves. The damage functions are 
highly nonlinear: average structural damage could be 10 percent at 100 mph, 25 percent 
at 130 mph, and 80 percent at 160 mph (Watson 1724, 2004).  
The proprietary nature of the loss models examined by Watson is cause for an 
accepted tested methodology for estimating hurricane loss models. FEMA has addressed 
this with the hurricane wind model in HAZUS-MH. This computer is programmed to 
estimate structural damage and human displacement from hurricanes and other natural 
hazards. The hurricane wind model takes modeling beyond the parametric level at a 
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single location. HAZUS-MH develops a hurricane over its entire life cycle so damages 
correlate to the changes a hurricane undergoes when it makes landfall. The HAZUS-MH 
wind model does not statically model a hurricane such that damages are simply a function 
of a one static hurricane at one location at one ‘snapshot’ in time, the method used by the 
TAOS model.  Instead, hurricane forces are simulated over space and time to more 
realistically model a hurricane. Hurricane forces decrease as the distance from the eye 
wall increases and the hurricanes forces change as it travels over land and water.  
 Loss estimations are dependent on historical hurricane data to calculate the 
probability of landfall at particular locations. Knowledge of past tracks as well as the 
physical parameters (wind speed, pressure, etc.) of these hurricanes is important in 
predicting losses. The Hurricane Research Division of the National Hurricane Center has 
been reanalyzing hurricanes from 1851 to the present to create a database of past 
hurricanes. This database is called HURDAT, the official record of tropical storms and 
hurricanes for the Atlantic Ocean, Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea, including those 
that have made landfall in the United States (http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/hurdat/). 
 The reanalysis of past hurricanes is partly due to the extensive damage that 
occurred in south Florida when Hurricane Andrew swept across the state, when a debate 
ensued over the magnitude of Andrew. According to Rappaport (1994) Andrew 
completely destroyed over 25,000 homes and damaged over 100,000. Approximately 
90% of all mobile homes were destroyed. Economic losses to agriculture were over $1 
billion; total direct losses exceeded $26 billion (Landsea et al. 2004, 1700). There have 
been indirect economic effects as well. Ten years later the average property insurance has 
increased tenfold. Landsea et al. (2004) reanalyzed the intensity of Hurricane Andrew 
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and determined that Hurricane Andrew was in fact a category five hurricane when it 
made landfall on south Florida. Andrew’s winds were originally estimated at 128 kt; 
however, the reanalysis approximated winds at 145 kt at landfall on Fender Point, FL (13 
km NE of Homestead, FL).  
 The updated HURDAT database is important because this database gives us the 
most accurate current record of past storms. HAZUS-MH uses this database in generating 
stochastic hurricane scenarios. Due to the low frequency of hurricanes in the Tampa Bay 
area, stochastic hurricane models will be sensitive to the past hurricanes that have 
impacted the area both by direct landfalls and near misses. 
The advances that GIS has undergone and its increasing use in both natural and 
human environmental studies make it an excellent tool for modeling hurricane risk and 
vulnerability. Comprehensive emergency management is greatly served by GIS because 
an infinite number of spatial themes, i.e. demographics, roadways, potential hurricane 
tracks, can be managed in one environment.  
Bales and Waugh (1996), describe the role GIS played in Hurricane Andrew. The 
technology was an integral part of response and recovery. The usefulness of GIS is not 
limited to just spatial analyses. It will also aid in avoiding duplication of efforts by 
government agencies and avoid development of incompatible technologies (Bales and 
Waugh, 1996 329; Tobin and Montz, 2004a). Centralized databases such as the Florida 
Geographic Data Library (FGDL), the U.S. Census Bureau’s Topologically Integrated 
Encoding and Referencing (TIGER), and the USGS Seamless Data Distribution System 
offer geographic data that can be used for GIS analyses. For the most part, to create an 
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inventory of data is unnecessary because there are quality data already available. 
However, people who specialized in GIS are required to insure that it is used properly. 
Although GIS was used in recovery efforts, the Miami-Dade County Government 
did not utilize GIS to prepare for Hurricane Andrew. Technologies such as HAZUS-MH 
did not exist to estimate losses from Hurricane Andrew. Although the South Florida 
Water Management District used GIS to assess environmental impacts, modeling of 
urban impacts was not performed. A private company, Digital Matrix Services, Inc., 
volunteered its services of GIS mapping to the recovery efforts. The maps they provided 
helped 82 different agencies in the relief efforts (Bales and Waugh 1996, 333). Aerial 
photography was useful for assessing areas by comparing pre-Andrew and post-Andrew 
aerial imagery. Although DMS’s services were invaluable, it was realized that GIS was 
not effectively used during Hurricane Andrew and that this technology would be needed 
in the future. Recommendations from Andrew (Bales and Waugh 1996, 339): 
1. A strong GIS capability could have made the response more effective and might 
have speeded the recovery. 
2. Databases need to be created beforehand, rather than pieced together amidst the 
chaos of a disaster operation. 
3. Databases need to be easily transferable among GIS users. 
4. Emergency managers and public officials need to understand the capabilities of 
GIS analysis in order to better use it. 
 
HAZUS-MH 
Introduction 
 FEMA’s National Mitigation Strategy is based on the principle of communicating 
to people the risks that surround them in order to better prepare them for a hazard 
(Haddow and Bullock 2003, 9-12). This will better enable them to respond to and recover 
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from a hazard. The nomination of James Lee Witt of FEMA by President Clinton in 
1993, a year after Andrew, triggered the national effort to work to minimize risk by 
mitigation and the use of technologies such as GIS. Part of FEMA’s strategy involves 
modeling risk of hazards using a state of the art GIS program, HAZUS-MH. 
The HAZUS model, initially released in 1997, was developed to estimate losses 
from earthquakes. HAZUS was developed by FEMA and the National Institute of 
Building Sciences (NIBS).  
 The model has evolved into a multi-hazard loss estimation tool, HAZUS-MH 
(Hazards U.S. Multi-Hazard). This program now includes flooding and wind damage 
along with earthquakes. The hurricane model is programmed to estimate socioeconomic 
losses from hurricane winds in order to assist emergency operations personnel in 
evaluating, planning for, and mitigating the effects of hurricane winds. It can also assist 
policy makers in reducing wind damage to structures, reducing disaster payments, and 
better utilizing emergency management resources.  
The 2004 Hurricane Season was the first time that FEMA used HAZUS-MH. 
When Hurricane Ivan was projected to make landfall on the Florida panhandle, FEMA 
used this model to estimate losses in an effort to help local emergency management cope 
with Ivan.  
The hurricane model is the first component of the HAZUS wind model.  
Figure 2.2 shows the elements of the wind model, with the currently modeled elements 
highlighted in bold text. The model does not include the effects of storm surge, waves, 
and atmospheric pressure change. The next generation of the model will include these 
  28 
effects along with other severe weather such as thunderstorms, hail, tornadoes, and 
extratropical storms. 
It is important to note that tornadoes do occur during hurricanes. The magnitude 
of these tornadoes ranges from F-0 to F-1 on the Fujita scale. However, stronger 
tornadoes have been reported in major hurricanes. For example, Hurricane Isbell, October 
1964, produced four F-2 tornadoes (Elsner 1999, 27). Tornadoes are not included in the 
modeling conducted in this thesis, although potential wind damages to buildings resulting 
from tornadoes may be severe. 
Table 2.1 shows damage estimates consisting of building related losses, such as 
direct property damage, and business interruption losses (unable to run business due to 
damage) in terms of replacement value. The total number of buildings at least moderately 
damaged is estimated as well as the number of buildings completely destroyed. The 
probability of damage to specific building types (agriculture, industrial, residential, 
education) and the number of these buildings damaged are categorized by the level of 
damage sustained: minor, severe, total destruction (Table 2.2). Building damage to 
essential facilities, Emergency Operation Centers, fire stations, hospitals, schools, etc, is 
also estimated in terms of the number of these facilities damaged and the extent of 
damage. The expected loss of use is measured in days. An example of these damages is 
shown in Table 2.3. The number of hospital beds that would be lost in a hurricane and the 
availability of these beds one week and one month after the hurricane are also measured. 
Debris generation is estimated in tons of reinforced concrete/steel, brick/wood, and tree 
debris. The number of truckloads (at 25 tons per truck) is given to assist in debris 
removal.  
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Figure 2.2 HAZUS-MH Wind Model Elements 
  
  
Table 2.1 Example of Building-Related Economic Loss Estimates 
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Table 2.2 Example of Expected Building Damage by Occupancy Report 
 
 
Table 2.3 Example of Critical Facility Damage Report 
 
In addition to human impacts described earlier, HAZUS-MH has other advantages 
over TAOS. The TAOS model does not have the dynamic modeling capabilities of 
HAZUS-MH. One cannot program current parameters of threatening hurricanes and alter 
these parameters as the hurricane travels across water and land. TAOS does not estimate 
damages to critical facilities or how long they will be out of service. HAZUS-MH even 
estimates the percentage of hospital beds that will be out of service and how long. 
HAZUS-MH offers a wide variety of data shown in Figure 2.3 that can be mapped and 
used in emergency operations. 
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Figure 2.3 Hurricane Loss Estimation Methodology Outputs 
 
     
 
Cutter (1996, 530) lists three factors as the causes of disasters: risk exposure, 
vulnerability as social response, and vulnerability of place. For example, coastal areas are 
at a greater risk from hurricanes than inland areas. Areas along the coast can be compared 
with each other to determine which coastal areas are at the greatest risk. Mitigation of 
building practices can be developed to decrease the risk of these vulnerable areas. Critical 
facilities and evacuation routes are essential in response activities. If a hurricane is 
projected to landfall, the number of facilities that may be damaged can be assessed so 
responders do not send people to these facilities. HAZUS-MH is valuable in locating 
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areas that are likely to suffer the most destruction and recovery efforts can be made to 
remove debris. 
As noted, the hurricane model includes the effects of wind pressure, wind borne 
debris missiles, tree blow down, and rainfall. Storm duration is included to simulate the 
temporal effects of the storm. Storm surge is not currently used.  
Probabilistic hurricane scenarios use return period loss estimates. It is 
recommended that for scenario modeling, a maximum credible hurricane scenario be 
developed that is possible for the study area. According to the PLMS (2003, 1:15) the 
worst case scenario for Pinellas County is a Category 5 Hurricane heading northeast at 
less than 15 miles per hour that makes landfall at high tide near New Port Richey. A 24 
foot storm surge would inundate almost half of the County while the winds would destroy 
hundreds if not thousands of homes and cause damage to thousands more.  
 
HAZUS-MH Hurricane Model 
Referring to the work by Watson (2004), hurricane models calculating the effects 
of winds on buildings using roughness coefficients are dependent on the accuracy of 
wind models. These models are based solely on the parameters of hurricanes such as 
wind speed, pressure, eye radius, etc. A hurricane is simulated only at the study area. The 
track of movement of a hurricane is not considered.  
The hurricane wind model calculates the maximum sustained wind speeds and the 
peak gust wind speeds for census tracts. The model simulates the track of a hurricane 
from its formation in the Atlantic Ocean through its track, in the case of this thesis Tampa 
Bay, to its dissipation in the northern latitudes. As described by FEMA (2005a), central 
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pressure is modeled as a function of sea surface temperature, and the storm heading, 
speed, etc., are updated at each six-hour point in the storm history. Linear interpolation is 
used between the six-hour points. The approach is validated by comparing the site-
specific statistics of the key hurricane parameters of the simulated hurricane tracks with 
the statistics derived from the historical data. The historical data use the current 
HURDAT database compiled by the NHC’s Hurricane Research Division.  
 Validation of this model was performed by measuring the modeled wind speeds 
against observed wind speeds of twelve hurricanes. Based on these observations FEMA 
claims that this hurricane model is the most advanced model available. For further 
description of the model see FEMA 2005a. 
 
HAZUS Hurricane Model Methodology 
The basic steps in operating the model are: 
1. Selecting the study area: census tract, county, state.  
2. Specify hurricane hazard: a single user-defined scenario such as an oncoming 
hurricane; or probabilistic analysis. 
3. Provide additional user collected data of buildings, tree coverage, surface 
roughness, etc., if possible.  
4. Formulas embedded in HAZUS, damage probabilities, expected building losses, 
loss-of-use are computed for different classes of buildings. Amounts and types of 
debris are also generated.  
5. Results are used to compute damage estimates and shelter needs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  34 
Evacuation 
Introduction 
The decrease of hurricane activity in the 60’s and the rapid population growth in 
Florida, particularly along the coast, has led to increases in vulnerability. The decrease in 
hurricanes also has caused a decrease in the public awareness of hurricanes and how to 
respond to them. Sheets and Williams (2001) argue that the attention given to the Cold 
War and nuclear evacuations during the seventies and eighties may have contributed to 
the lack of attention to hurricane evacuations. Hurricane evacuation has not been studied 
as intensely as other evacuation strategies, especially nuclear response. Nuclear 
evacuation does not have the same temporal component that hurricane evacuation does. 
A nuclear evacuation would have little warning and everyone within an area, for example 
a 10 mile buffer, would need to evacuate as soon as possible. Hurricane evacuation is of 
course more complicated due to issues such as fluctuations in forecasting and 
determining the areas to be evacuated. 
 Transportation is one of the most important aspects of response and recovery 
during a hurricane (Cova and Conger 2004). It is important that emergency management 
agencies develop and maintain evacuation strategies that enable people to leave at risk 
areas in the most efficient way possible. Such strategies, once developed, need to be 
updated to address changes in areas such as population increases due to development, and 
infrastructure such as road construction projects.  The problems that arise in evacuation 
planning are founded on the same themes as assessing natural hazard vulnerability: social 
vulnerability, the conditions of the built environment, and geophysical risk. 
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 Projecting the track of a hurricane is fortunately something we can do with 
reasonable accuracy. We can forecast where a hurricane will likely go within 36 to 48 
hours. We can to some degree prepare for the onset of a hurricane by boarding windows, 
stocking food supplies, etc. However this 36 to 48 hour window is still too large in 
determining exactly where a landfall will occur, so only the potentially impacted area can 
be evacuated. Barret et al. (2000) argued that with 36 or more hours of warning, most 
evacuations can be performed. Therefore, until our understanding of hurricanes develops 
more accurate forecasting models, we need to err on the side of caution and evacuate 
potentially large areas at a time where the average citizen may feel is premature. 
According to the Pinellas County Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, the 
clearance time for the county is ten to seventeen hours depending on the size of the 
evacuation area. However, because a large evacuation has never occurred in Pinellas, the 
upper estimates may not be reliable, particularly if they are calculated with standard 
traffic simulators. 
 Human perception in hurricane response is the most difficult if not impossible to 
predict in context to evacuation. The public can place too much faith in hurricane 
forecasts causing them to stay home. In the case of Hurricane Charley, Tobin et al. (2005) 
determined that one of the main reasons people did not evacuate in Charlotte County is 
because the people Charley would make landfall on Tampa Bay. These people along with 
the rest of Florida focused on the “line” used by television news services that projected 
Charley’s track at Tampa Bay instead of focusing on the large swath that encompassed 
the line. The media were blamed for communicating the line as the area most at risk 
when in reality the swath encompassing the line was the area at risk. 
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People may choose not to evacuate because of fears of looting, which is usually 
overblown by the media. However, as was witnessed in New Orleans in the Hurricane 
Katrina disaster, looting was a problem. Other reasons not to evacuate are the refusal to 
leave pets and personal effects behind, and the feeling that there is nowhere to go. During 
Hurricane Charley, many evacuated from the coast inland to the Orlando area, only to put 
themselves directly in the path of the still dangerous storm. 
 For the people that do evacuate, their strategy may not be the same as the 
evacuation strategy of the local emergency management agency. DeSilva (2001) argues 
that there are two groups who will perceive evacuation differently, the evacuees and the 
evacuators. The routes that emergency management officials want the public to use and 
the destination once evacuation is complete will likely differ from those perceived by the 
evacuees.  
 The roads that are used in evacuation and the availability of safe places to go will 
determine how and if people evacuate. People may not evacuate if they feel they will be 
stuck in gridlocked traffic. People with pets may not go to a shelter due to a lack of pet 
friendly public shelters. The poor may not evacuate because of financial restraints. If a 
low income family does not have family or friends to stay with, they may not be able to 
afford to stay at a hotel.  
The type of homes people live in will contribute to their perceived vulnerability. 
If a family lives in a home that they feel will withstand a hurricane then they may not 
evacuate. This perception may be wrong. Tobin et al. (2005) found that people did not 
evacuate because they felt that they were safe in their homes, only to have Hurricane 
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Charley blow the roofs off. Some did not evacuate until after Charley passed through 
Charlotte County.  
 Lindell and Perry (1992) identify two problems with evacuation. The first 
problem is transportation support. An example of this problem lies in social vulnerability. 
Social groups who are more vulnerable, such as the poor, the very young and very old, 
are also likely not to have means of evacuating themselves so emergency planning must 
accommodate these people. Also, there is a percentage of people that do not have 
automobiles and rely on public transportation out of personal choice. However, if an area 
will not be congested because the evacuating population does not have cars then it may 
be that it is less likely that traffic problems will arise during an evacuation. The people 
may be evacuated by bus, thus decreasing the load on the roadways. Therefore, local 
emergency management agencies must assess their means of evacuating these people.  
The second problem identified by Lindell and Perry (1992) is traffic management. 
This problem deals with traffic congestion, construction zones, obstructions such as 
downed trees or powerlines, etc. These two problems ask two questions: 
1. Are people vulnerable because of the infrastructure, in this case the traffic 
conditions of the evacuation routes?   
2.  Are people vulnerable because they do not have personal means of 
evacuation?  
 
Lindell et al. (1992, 91) listed a number of ways that evacuation can be managed: 
1. Identify areas that are susceptible to the hazard. 
2. Assess the vulnerable population of the susceptible areas. 
3. Assess the capabilities of the affected population to evacuate. 
4. Assess the adequacy of the roadways. 
5. Identify problem areas in the evacuation. 
6. Design mitigation to deal with problem areas.  
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This methodology can be viewed as the process of assessing evacuation 
vulnerability. Hazardous areas are identified through hurricane loss modeling. The 
vulnerability of communities is assessed using demographic data. The evacuation routes 
are analyzed using GIS to identify areas that are likely to have traffic problems.  
 
Evacuation Modeling 
 The literature pertaining to evacuation consists of studies with a traffic 
engineering perspective. These studies are mainly temporal, focusing on clearing times of 
evacuation zones and travel times of evacuation routes. A number of studies simulated 
the flow of traffic of potential evacuation scenarios (Sinuany-Stern and Stern 1993; 
Southworth 1991; Cova and Johnson 2003). Also, traffic management strategies such as 
contraflow, the practice of reversing lanes to increase highway capacity, were tested to 
analyze how this strategy can increase traffic flow (Cova and Conger 2004; Wolshon 
2001).  Sorenson et al. (1992) studied ways of delimiting emergency planning zones. 
Cova and Church (1997) developed a method using GIS for assessing the evacuation 
vulnerability of neighborhoods by identifying potential evacuation bottlenecks.  
The literature is scarce, however, on how the conditions of the transportation 
system affect people’s vulnerability. Chakraborty et al. (2005) assessed evacuation 
vulnerability as a function of geophysical risk and social vulnerability. This study found 
that evacuators need to consider not only places where damages will be severe, but also 
places where people are highly vulnerable because of a lack of evacuation resources, 
even though tangible losses may not be severe. Evacuation modeling needs to take a 
multi-faceted approach especially in dealing with hurricanes. 
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 Barret et al. (2000) proposed a theoretical framework for a dynamic hurricane 
evacuation model. They characterized the components of hurricane evacuation as: 
1. advanced warning of onset 
2.  knowledge of the speed of onset and magnitude of hurricane 
3.  knowledge of high risk locations 
4.  evacuation on a regional scale 
5. the potential for large damages to the evacuation road network 
 
Modeling evacuation using “off the shelf” transportation programs may not be the 
solution to solving evacuation problems. Models and algorithms specified and calibrated 
in ordinary conditions cannot be directly applied in emergency conditions (Russo and 
Vinetta 2002, 315). Barret et al. (2000) argued that one cannot use general traffic 
modeling because of the extreme nature of a hurricane evacuation. They recommend then 
that the number of individuals needing evacuation and the demographic conditions of the 
evacuees be modeled. In other words, transportation models that consider rush hour 
traffic to the central business district will not work in evacuation studies. Evacuation 
modeling must consider very large volumes of traffic flowing continuously in one 
direction until the “at risk” area is cleared. Destination is also a factor that is different. In 
modeling Pinellas County, the concern is to get everyone out using a limited number of 
routes; modeling transportation will have an infinite number of destinations and larger 
flexibility of routes. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 This review of the literature pertaining to hazard vulnerability analysis, hurricane 
modeling, and evacuation studies explains the concepts and problems in modeling 
hurricane response. An understanding of these concepts is necessary to the development 
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of a method of analyzing hurricane evacuation vulnerability and applying this method to 
Pinellas County, Florida. 
 Evacuation is a critical component to Pinellas County’s hurricane response plan 
because of its landscape. Factors such as high population density and the limited number 
of evacuation routes demand careful planning in evacuating this peninsular county. 
Therefore, in responding to a hurricane it is necessary to determine where problems are 
likely to occur and where evacuation assistance is needed.  
 The goal of this thesis is to develop a model of hurricane evacuation vulnerability. 
This model is based on the theoretical framework developed in this literature review and 
is designed to answer the following research questions: 
1. Where in Pinellas County are people vulnerable to hurricane evacuation 
problems? 
2. What are the factors that make people vulnerable in an evacuation? 
3. How vulnerable are people to suffering losses from hurricanes? 
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Chapter Three 
 Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter will describe the methods used to model evacuation vulnerability. 
The term evacuation vulnerability is used in context to the level of difficulty people will 
have in evacuating from a hurricane. While it is possible to focus on evacuation 
vulnerability solely from a transportation perspective, the model developed in this thesis 
combines social, transportation, and geophysical aspects of natural hazards research in 
order to assess evacuation vulnerability from a broader perspective. This model produces 
an index that when mapped, identifies locations within Pinellas County where evacuation 
problems will likely occur and the degree of damage that may be expected in these areas 
from a particular hurricane.  
This chapter begins with a brief review of Pinellas County’s vulnerability to 
hurricanes and the importance of evacuation. Then, the methods used to quantify the 
social, transportation, and geophysical components of the Hurricane Evacuation 
Vulnerability Index (HEVI) are introduced. Next, the spatial resolution of the HEVI is 
explained. The next three sections describe the methods used to model the social, 
transportation, and geophysical aspects of the HEVI.  In the fourth section, the 
compilation of the Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index is described. 
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Modeling Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability in Pinellas County, Florida 
 As discussed earlier, evacuating Pinellas County in the event of a major hurricane 
is problematic because of its landscape and high population density. The low elevation of 
this peninsular county makes it vulnerable to coastal flooding. Pinellas County is 
especially vulnerable to a hurricane traveling over the Gulf of Mexico that comes within 
close proximity to or makes landfall on the county. Pinellas County is the most densely 
populated county within the state of Florida with a population density of 3,291 people per 
square mile (U.S. Bureau of the Census). During an evacuation, the majority of the 
evacuees would have to travel across bridges one of four bridges over Tampa Bay. The 
methods described in this chapter are used to develop a model of evacuation vulnerability 
that combines different aspects of hazards research. The research questions this thesis 
will answer are:  
1. Where in Pinellas County are people vulnerable to hurricane evacuation 
problems? 
2. What are the factors that make people vulnerable in an evacuation? 
3. How vulnerable are people to suffering losses from hurricanes? 
  
 Census tracts within Pinellas County are indexed based on their level of hurricane 
evacuation vulnerability. This Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index (HEVI) is the 
compilation of three indices that represent different aspects of hazards vulnerability 
analyses: social vulnerability, evacuation vulnerability, and geophysical impact to the 
built environment. Each of these indices is compiled using different methods.  
Geophysical impact to the built environment is assessed based on the model 
results of a tightly coupled GIS program, HAZUS-MH. Evacuation vulnerability is 
modeled in a GIS environment using ESRI’s ArcGIS 9.1. Social vulnerability is the least 
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intensive from a GIS data processing perspective. This component uses statistical 
calculations to assess vulnerability. 
 The social component models social vulnerability using a method developed by 
Chakraborty et al. (2005). Demographic variables such as poverty are compiled in an 
index quantifying the degree to which social groups may have difficulty evacuating. This 
Social Vulnerability Evacuation Assistance Index combines elements of population and 
structure, differential access to resources, and special needs populations attempting to 
address certain social traits that may impede ones ability to evacuate and require 
evacuation assistance from emergency management agencies  
(Chakraborty et al. 2005, 26). 
 The evacuation vulnerability component focuses on the evacuation route network 
of Pinellas County to identify areas where evacuation may be impeded due to traffic 
problems. The Evacuation Vulnerability Index (EVI) is derived from a GIS model that 
calculates where traffic congestion may be the greatest as well as the distance that 
households travel to evacuate.  
The geophysical component of this model is called the Hurricane Loss Estimation 
Index. This index is calculated using modeled results from the HAZUS-MH software. 
Damage estimates are used to index census tracts based on the degree of structural 
damage that may occur in the event of a hurricane. This component of the HEVI aims to 
identify the areas that may suffer the most damage from a particular hurricane and will 
need to evacuate as well as to provide a researcher a means to use the HEVI to assist in 
evacuation planning. For example, a hypothetical scenario could be modeled if a 
researcher wanted to evaluate evacuation vulnerability in context to a specific hurricane 
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(Tobin et al. 2004b). The HLEI is compiled twice, using loss estimates of hurricanes of 
two different return periods. The two Hurricane Loss Estimation Indices are compiled to 
test the sensitivity of the HEVI to different hurricanes. 
The Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index (HEVI) is the sum of the Social 
Vulnerability Evacuation Assistance Index (SVEAI), Evacuation Vulnerability Index 
(EVI), and Hurricane Loss Estimation Index (HLEI). The sensitivity of the modeled 
results of the HEVI will be tested in two ways. First, by using two different hurricanes to 
examine how different hurricane intensities and tracks will affect the values of the HEVI. 
Second, by examining how weighting each of the three indices will affect the values of 
the HEVI.  
 The spatial resolution of this analysis is at the census tract level because of 
HAZUS-MH. The software estimates loss at the census tract level. The SVEAI and EVI 
index can be calculated at a level of higher spatial resolution, for example, than census 
block group. However, because the Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index is only as 
detailed as the coarsest scale of its three components, the census tract level is used for the 
analysis.  
 The methods described here are applied to empirically assess Pinellas County’s 
vulnerability however, these methods are applicable to other counties where hurricanes 
are among the natural hazards that a county experiences.  
 
Social Vulnerability Evacuation Assistance Index (SVEAI) 
 Social vulnerability is modeled using a methodology designed by Chakraborty et 
al. (2005). This study calculates a Social Vulnerability for Evacuation Assistance Index 
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using the socioeconomic variables in Figure 3.1.The census tracts within Pinellas County 
are assigned a Social Vulnerability Evacuation Access score. This score is calculated as 
follows (Chakraborty et al. 2005, 26): 
1. Determine the ratio of the variable in each block 
group to the total number of that variable in Pinellas 
County (Ri). 
 
2. Compute a standardized social vulnerability for 
evacuation assistance index (SVEAIi) for variable i 
using the maximum ratio value (Rmax) observed in 
Pinellas County. 
 
SVEAIi = Ri  
        Rmax 
 
3. To combine multiple variables in the assessment of 
social vulnerability, calculate the arithmetic mean of 
the vulnerability indices by dividing the sum of 
index values of all variables by the number of 
variables (n) considered. 
 
     SVEAI = SVEAIi  
            n 
 
This calculation results in values ranging from 0 to 1, where 1 represents those who are 
most socially vulnerable and need help evacuating.  
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Figure 3.1  Framework of Social Vulnerability for Evacuation Assistance Index                 
     
 
Evacuation Vulnerability Index (EVI) 
 
Evacuation vulnerability is modeled with GIS using ESRI’s ArcGIS 9.1. 
Evacuation vulnerability is assessed by two variables. The first variable, Evacuation 
Route Intersection Load is based on the number of households that will utilize an 
intersection of roadways as their entering point of the evacuation route network as 
mapped by Pinellas County Emergency Management. This variable determines the 
population load that each evacuation route intersection will be under during an 
evacuation. Population load in this context refers to the number of households. The 
second variable, Evacuation Distance is represented as the shortest distance of each 
evacuation route intersection from the county exiting point of the evacuation route. In 
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other words, the further a household has to travel to evacuate the more likely traffic 
problems will be encountered.  
This analysis uses a major road GIS layer acquired from the Florida Geographic 
Data Library (FGDL 2005). The roadways are defined as major roads by the Florida 
Department of Transportation and are acquired from the Florida Geographic Data Library 
(FGDL 2005). The evacuation routes were selected from the major roads GIS layer based 
on a map from Pinellas County Emergency Management.  
The resolution of the road network used in this thesis assumes that all roads are 
equal in lane width and traffic rules. For example, two lane roads and six lane highways 
are treated equally. Roadways are also bidirectional; however, the direction of a route 
may be restricted to one direction to facilitate an evacuation. Interstate 275 is an 
exception to these assumptions because both the north and south bound lanes are used as 
well as the exit and on ramps. The intersections of the evacuation routes and Interstate 
275 are represented as the point where the on ramps connect to the evacuation routes 
rather than where the interstate overpasses the evacuation routes. 
An important note of this analysis is that the intersections were verified using an 
aerial photograph of the county to address certain instances where what appeared to be an 
intersection of the GIS road layer was actually an overpass. 
The roadways used in the EVI are limited to the major roadways and those major 
roadways that comprise the evacuation route network. These roadways were used as 
opposed to utilizing all of the roads in Pinellas County because of the census tract spatial 
resolution of this analysis. If this analysis were to be carried out at a higher resolution, 
such as the census block level, then it would be useful to use the entire road network of 
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Pinellas County. However, as discussed earlier, because this analysis is restricted by the 
spatial scale of the HAZUS-MH software, this analysis is performed at the census tract 
level.  
It is important to note that this part of this analysis assumes that the entire county 
population is evacuating in the event of a hurricane. Currently, a county wide evacuation 
order is not mandatory regardless of a hurricanes intensity. Areas that are required to 
evacuate are limited to flood prone areas and coastal areas potentially exposed to storm 
surge as mapped in Figure 3.2.  
Figure 3.2 Pinellas County Hurricane Evacuation Zones 
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Evacuation Route Intersection Load 
The Evacuation Route Intersection Load (ERIL) variable is designed to address 
the likelihood of congestion at the intersections between evacuation routes and major 
roadways. ERIL is calculated by determining the number of households that may enter an 
evacuation route via the closest major road intersection. This technique does involve 
assumptions. For the purpose of this analysis, the assumption is made that the greater the 
number of households utilizing a particular intersection as the entrance point to the 
evacuation system, greater the likelihood of traffic problems such as congestion and 
accidents increases. Other assumptions of this technique are that a household will 
evacuate using one vehicle, use the nearest evacuation intersection, and travel the shortest 
distance to evacuate the county.  Of course in reality an alternative evacuation route may 
be taken, or the evacuation routes may not be used at all.  
It is important that I note that traffic conditions of all of the intersections that a 
household will encounter along a particular route will obviously affect evacuation 
vulnerability. Again, this technique only accounts for the number of households entering 
an evacuation route at a major road intersection. The second variable of the EVI, 
Evacuation Distance, is designed to address this problem. The greater the distance a 
household needs to travel to evacuate, the greater the number of intersections, also 
congested, will be encountered in evacuating.  
The evacuation route intersection loads are calculated for each intersection of the 
major roads of Pinellas County and the evacuation routes. A technique is used where 
Theissen polygons are generated for each intersection node, mapped in Figure 3.3. The 
number of households using the intersection is computed using an areal interpolation 
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technique. A map of the results of this technique is shown in Figure 3.4. For example, if 
50 percent of a census tract falls within a particular Theissen polygon and there are 2,000 
households within that census tract, then 1,000 households are assigned to the polygon. 
The total number of households interpolated from all of the census tracts intersected by 
the polygon represents the evacuation route intersection load. This Evacuation Route 
Intersection Load is then assigned to the node representing the intersection. Using a GIS 
spatial join, the Evacuation Route Intersection Load for each of the nodes is assigned to 
the respective census tracts. When more than one node falls within a census tract, the 
maximum evacuation household load value is used to represent a worse case scenario. 
Census tracts that do not contain an evacuation route intersection are assigned the value 
of the nearest evacuation route intersection node. This distance does not use the road 
network distance, but instead uses straight line distance, which is a limiting factor in the 
analysis and must be noted. The GIS processing used to calculate evacuation load is 
briefly described in Figure 3.5. For a detailed chart refer to the Appendix.  
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Figure 3.3 Theissen Evacuation Areas 
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Figure 3.4 Evacuation Route Intersection Loads of Evacuation Route Intersections 
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Figure 3.5 Evacuation Route Intersection Load GIS Processing 
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Evacuation Distance 
The second variable of the EVI is Evacuation Distance (ED). This variable 
addresses the likelihood that a household will experience traffic problems based on the 
distance required to evacuate. This variable is underpinned by the assumption that the 
further a household needs to travel to evacuate, the more likely that traffic problems will 
be encountered. Also, as discussed earlier in the description of ERIL, more intersections 
that may already be suffering from traffic congestion will be encountered.  
This method determines evacuation vulnerability based on the distance of the 
evacuation route intersection from the nearest evacuation exiting point. This exiting point 
is the point that an evacuation route meets the boundary of Pinellas County. Certainly an 
individual has not reached safety once exiting Pinellas County and it is not the intention 
of this research to make this implication. This method is only an objective way of 
determining evacuation distance. Also, the condition of the evacuation network, social 
vulnerability, or hurricane risk outside of Pinellas County is not considered. Of course in 
reality, conditions outside of Pinellas County affect perceptions and actions of individuals 
within the county. 
The network distance of the evacuation intersections to the nearest evacuation 
route exiting point is calculated using the shortest route function of the Network Analyst 
extension in ESRI’s ArcView 3.2. Figure 3.6 maps the evacuation distance of each 
intersection to the exiting point. The evacuation distance of each evacuation route 
intersection node is assigned to the census tracts that are represented by that node. The 
distances of the respective nodes are assigned to each census tract using a spatial join in a 
similar manner as described in evacuation route intersection load computation. Tracts that 
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do not contain a node are assigned the evacuation distance of the nearest node. Tracts that 
contain more than one node are assigned the distance of the node with the lowest 
evacuation distance. The lowest distance is used because as discussed earlier, the 
assumption is made that a household will evacuate using the shortest route.  
The indices for Evacuation Route Intersection Load and Evacuation Distance are 
calculated using the same method as previously described for the SVEAI. The 
intersection load and evacuation distance values of each tract are divided by their 
respective maximum values for the entire county. Index values range from 0 to 1, where 
1 represents the greatest evacuation route intersection load and evacuation distance. The 
Evacuation Vulnerability Index is calculated as the average value of the Evacuation 
Intersection Load Index and the Evacuation Distance Index. 
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Figure 3.6 Evacuation Distance of Evacuation Route Intersections 
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Hurricane Loss Estimation Index (HLEI) 
The geophysical component of the HEVI is derived from the loss estimations 
computed by HAZUS-MH as well as determining household exposure to storm surge 
using GIS. Storm surge is modeled using an areal interpolation technique that calculates 
the percentage of households in each census tract that will be exposed to storm surge. The 
probabilistic function of the HAZUS-MH model is used to estimate loss from hurricane 
winds and rainfall. Modeling the structural loss and consequent human displacement 
answers the third research question of this thesis:  
“How vulnerable are people to suffering losses from hurricanes?” 
Locating areas that will suffer damages is of course necessary for determining the 
areas that need to be evacuated. While areas vulnerable to storm surge and flooding 
definitely need to be evacuated, there may be other areas that will suffer wind damage 
identified by HAZUS-MH. It is difficult to mandate a countywide evacuation. Advisories 
to evacuate should be given to these areas and the government needs to plan to facilitate 
evacuation. 
The loss estimates from two hurricanes generated by HAZUS-MH with return 
periods of 100 years and 1,000 years are used to examine the degree of damage that may 
result from these hurricanes as well as the spatial variation of damage.  The hurricanes for 
the respective return periods shown in Figure 3.7 vary in magnitude and trajectory. 
Therefore utilizing these two hurricanes provides variation to the results. These 
hurricanes were selected because they differ in probability of occurrence, intensity, and 
trajectory. The 1,000 year event is a major hurricane that travels offshore but in close 
proximity to Pinellas County and has severe loss estimates. The 100 year event travels a 
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northwest trajectory and makes landfall on the south part of the county. The loss 
estimates are less severe than the 1,000 year event but are more probable. Indeed other 
hurricanes could have been selected from the probabilistic hurricanes generated by 
HAZUS-MH. However the loss estimates of the hurricanes with return periods less than 
100 years were not severe enough to warrant an evacuation. The loss estimates and 
trajectories of the hurricanes with return periods greater than 100 years were similar to 
the 1,000 year event and therefore are somewhat redundant for this analysis. 
The HAZUS-MH loss estimations used in the HLEI are: 
− Probability of at least severe damage to residential homes 
− Total displaced households 
− Total households with public shelter needs 
HAZUS-MH does not estimate losses resulting from storm surge. The effects of 
storm surge result in significant losses therefore it is necessary to include a storm surge 
component in the HLEI. For the purpose of this thesis, the number of households that 
would experience storm surge from hurricanes of the respective return periods is 
calculated for each census tract. The HLEI calculation utilizing the 1,000 year hurricane 
calculates storm surge at the category four level; the 100 year event includes category 
two level storm surge. 
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Figure 3.7 HAZUS-MH Probabilistic Hurricane Tracks of Pinellas County: 1,000 Year Event in Red, 100 Year Event in Yellow 
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The intensity of the HAZUS-MH generated probabilistic hurricanes is determined 
based on the peak gust wind speeds. HAZUS-MH does not report the maximum sustained 
wind speeds for theses hurricanes, the program only reports the peak gust winds. The 
intensity of the probabilistic hurricanes is determined based on Table 3.1 (FEMA 2005). 
The levels of storm surge used in the HLEI are then determined based on the appropriate 
hurricane category. For example, if a hurricane has a maximum gust wind speed of 120 
miles per hour (over water) the storm surge levels for tropical storms, category one, and 
category two hurricanes are used in the calculation. 
 
Table 3.1 Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Categories (FEMA 2005) 
Saffir-
Simpson 
Category 
Minimum 
Central 
Pressure 
(mb) 
Maximum 
Sustained Wind 
Speed Over Water 
(mph) 
Maximum 
Gust Speed 
Over Water 
(mph) 
Maximum Gust 
Speed Over Land,  
z = 0.03m (mph) 
1 980 74-94 91-116 82-108 
2 979-965 94-110 116-140 108-130 
3 964-945 110-130 140-165 130-156 
4 944-920 130-155 165-195 156-191 
5 920 >155 >195 >191 
 
 An areal interpolation technique briefly explained earlier is used to calculate the 
number of households that would directly experience storm surge. This technique is 
based on the model (Chakraborty and Armstrong 1996; Liu 2001; Margai 2001; Most et 
al. 2004):  
                                                                             n               m 
P =  Pi +  [Pj ( Aje / Aj )] 
                                                                            i=0            j=0 
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Where:  
P = total population inferred through the interpolation 
process. 
n = number of geographic units (e.g., census tracts) 
contained entirely within the delimiting boundary. 
Pi = population of the intact geographic unit, n. 
m = those partial geographic units (as might be truncated by 
a GIS operation). 
Pj = population corresponding to the partial geographic 
unit, m. 
Aje = the partial area of the truncated geographic unit. 
Aj = the total area of the truncated geographic unit. 
 
This formula calculates the number of households in a census tract after a GIS 
intersect operation divides the census unit by the storm surge zone. For example, if 4,000 
people live in a census tract and 50 percent of the tract is located in the storm surge zone 
after it is intersected with the storm surge layer, then there will be 2,000 people, assuming 
that the population is evenly distributed. 
The GIS storm surge layer used in this calculation is not derived from the specific 
path of the HAZUS-MH generated hurricane. It is based on elevation; so in reality 
flooding from storm surge may be more severe in some locations than others. Also, while 
the level of storm surge, i.e. category four, is determined by the wind speeds over land, 
the level of storm surge may be higher or lower based on the characteristics of the 
hurricane before it impacts Pinellas County. For example, a hurricane traveling at seven 
miles per hour will generate a greater degree of storm surge than one traveling at a faster 
speed, everything else being equal. This is because a hurricane with a ‘slower’ translation 
speed will have more time to push water away from the eyewall. Dynamic storm surge 
modeling would be valuable to this analysis in calculating where storm surge will be 
greatest based on the parameters of a specific hurricane. Unfortunately such a model, for 
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example the Sea, Lake and Overland Surge Model (SLOSH) is not available for use in 
this analysis.  
The HLEI is calculated using the mathematical formula described in the SVEAI 
index (Chakraborty et al. 2005). The probability of at least severe damage to residential 
buildings per census tract is divided by the maximum possible value, 100 percent. The 
“At Least Severe Damage to Residential Buildings” variable is the probability that a 
home will be severely damaged or completely destroyed. For example, if the maximum 
probability of at least severe damage is 100 percent in a particular census tract, then the 
tract will be assigned a score of 1.0.  
The proportion of displaced households, households with public shelter needs, 
and households inundated by storm surge per census tract are also divided by the 
maximum possible value, 100 percent. The final HLEI is calculated by averaging the 
scores of all of the variables (n = 4). 
 
Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index (HEVI) 
 The Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index is the sum of the Social 
Vulnerability for Evacuation Assistance Index (SVEAI), the Evacuation Vulnerability 
Index (EVI), and the Hurricane Loss Estimation Index (HLEI) for the 100 year and 1,000 
year hurricanes.  
Different calculations of the HEVI, or the three indices from which it is derived, 
will produce different results. It is also arguable that one or more of the indices are more 
or less important in assessing evacuation vulnerability. While it is beyond the scope of 
this thesis to develop such an argument, a section is offered at the end of this chapter 
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exploring the application of weighting coefficients. This is done to offer variability in the 
final results in order to explore how accentuating each of the components affects the 
HEVI. Three separate calculations of the HEVI are performed, doubling the value of one 
of the three indices. An example equation of this weighting scheme placing emphasis on 
the Evacuation Vulnerability Index is:  
 HEVI = (2 EVI) + SVEAI + HLEI  
 
Summary 
 The methods described in this chapter combine hurricane vulnerability and loss 
modeling to identify where people will have difficulty evacuating from a hurricane. 
Social vulnerability modeling is used to assess the degree of difficulty that social groups 
will have in evacuating due to societal problems. In addition to social problems, people 
may face difficulty in evacuating because of the evacuation network. Evacuees will 
encounter a certain degree of traffic congestion caused by traffic bottlenecks at 
intersections. Also, the farther an evacuee has to travel to evacuate, the greater the chance 
that traffic problems will arise. Modeling the evacuation network in context to 
transportation problems addresses these issues.  
 Incorporating the loss estimates of HAZUS-MH directs response measures to 
areas that will suffer from specific hurricanes. This is a dynamic component of this 
analysis because of HAZUS-MH. The probabilistic functionality of HAZUS-MH models 
hurricanes of different return periods as well as a hurricane forecast to make landfall on 
the county. The loss estimates of these hurricanes can be used to assess the evacuation 
strategy based on the characteristics of specific hurricanes. These estimates are important 
 64 
in terms of vulnerability because the degree of loss of vulnerable social groups can be 
determined. 
 The next chapter describes the results of this analysis. I will begin with explaining 
the results of the SVEAI, EVI, and HLEI. Then I will discuss the results of the Hurricane 
Evacuation Vulnerability Index compiled with the loss estimates of the two hurricanes 
described earlier. Finally, I will examine how weighting the values of the SVEAI, EVI, 
and HLEI affect the results of the HEVI.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 65 
 
 
 
Chapter Four 
 Results 
Introduction 
The results of the Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index are used to answer 
the following research questions: 
1. Where in Pinellas County are people vulnerable to hurricane evacuation 
problems? 
2. What are the factors that make people vulnerable in an evacuation? 
3. How vulnerable are people to suffering losses from hurricanes? 
The factors that will cause people to have evacuation difficulty vary by location. 
Pinellas County is found to be vulnerable to traffic problems in the event of an 
evacuation at locations throughout the county, primarily on the west coast. The 
households that need to travel the greatest distance to evacuate are also located in areas 
where traffic congestion is the greatest. Conversely, households that may require 
assistance in evacuating because they lack the means to evacuate, for example vehicles, 
are located in isolated areas. Focusing on geophysical impact, the residential homes 
within Pinellas County will experience severe damages from the 1,000 year hurricane 
generated by HAZUS-MH. In contrast, the loss estimates from the 100 year hurricane are 
minor. The areas that will need to be evacuated from the 100 year hurricane are confined 
to the coast so widespread evacuation problems should not be an issue. However, an 
evacuation from a major hurricane such as the 1,000 year will require planning. Based on 
the loss estimates of HAZUS-MH, the 1,000 year hurricane would severely damage or 
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completely destroy residential homes throughout the majority of the county, including 
areas that are not within the evacuation planning zones. The modeled results described in 
this chapter can be used for evacuation planning and direct emergency response measures 
to vulnerable areas, especially in preparation for major hurricanes. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows, the first three sections explain the 
results of the three sub-indices of the Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index. Results 
of the Social Vulnerability for Evacuation Assistance Index are explained first, followed 
by the Evacuation Vulnerability Index. The results of the Hurricane Loss Estimation 
Index is divided into two subsections, first explaining the results using the 1,000 year 
hurricane, then the results using the 100 year hurricane. The next section explains the 
results of the Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index. Again, this index is compiled 
twice, using the Hurricane Loss Estimation Index of the 1,000 year and 100 year 
hurricanes. Thus, the results of the two Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Indices are 
explained for each respective hurricane. This section includes an examination of how 
applying weighting coefficients to the SVEA, EV, and HLE indices when calculating the 
HEVI affects the final results. The chapter concludes with a brief summary of the results 
and a list of the findings. 
 
Social Vulnerability for Evacuation Assistance Index (SVEAI) 
 The most vulnerable area in terms of social vulnerability evacuation assistance is 
located in southeastern Pinellas County, as shown in Figure 4.1.  The SVEA scores for 
the poverty, no telephone, no vehicle, and disabled variables are highest at these census 
tracts. It can be argued that the poverty variable, mapped in Figure 4.2, is more 
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significant than the telephone and vehicle variables because they are likely to be the 
reason that a family does not own a telephone, mapped in Figure 4.3, and certainly not a 
vehicle. However, the cause of a high no vehicle score, mapped in Figure 4.4, may also 
be due to this vulnerable areas location, downtown St. Petersburg. People may choose not 
to own a vehicle because they can use public transportation, walk, etc. 
 The remaining census tracts of the county have moderate SVEA scores. However, 
some small areas relative to the southeast are identified as highly vulnerable. For example 
a census tract in the center of the county received a high SVEA score. This is the result of 
high scores for the Under Age 5, Institutionalized Population in Group Quarters, Poverty, 
and Single Parent variables.  
 There is also a census tract located in the west coast of the county that received a 
high SVEA score. This area has high scores for the Age Under 5, Age Over 85, 
Institutionalized Population in Group Quarters, Without a Vehicle, and Single Parent 
variables. 
 Based on the map in Figure 4.1, special evacuation preparations for socially 
vulnerable areas are primarily necessary in a small number of locations. However, 
emergency management does have another significant variable to consider in evacuation 
management, the disabled. Figure 4.5 is a map of the disability index where census tracts 
with high values are distributed throughout the county. The disabled may require 
transportation assistance in the event of an evacuation.  
 It is interesting to note that high values for the population institutionalized in 
group quarters, ages under 5, and ages over 85 variables are found in relatively few 
census tracts in Pinellas County when compared to the other variables, especially 
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poverty. The majority of the census tracts received very low scores for these variables as 
shown in Figures 4.6; 4.7, and 4.8, respectively. Certainly, this does not indicate that 
these variables are not important to social vulnerability modeling. These results are only 
representative of Pinellas County’s demographic composition. Performing this analysis in 
another county or metropolitan area will probably have different results. From an 
emergency management perspective, the results of these variables for Pinellas County 
can aid in response and recovery. The areas represented by census tracts with high values 
for the three variables can be areas of concern for emergency managers. For example, the 
census tract in the center of the county in Figure 4.1 may require public transportation to 
evacuate the very young and very old. 
 The results for the single parent variable are mapped in Figure 4.9. This variable 
scored very high for the majority of the census tracts throughout the county. Assisting the 
single parent population in evacuating may not be effective due to the large number of 
single parent households, however in planning for hurricane response it may be useful to 
communicate ways that a single parent can prepare for a hurricane. For example, allow 
more time to prepare to evacuate or ask for assistance from a friend or family member.  
 An issue that is of concern in the Tampa Bay area is the number of mobile and 
manufactured homes that are subject to mandatory evacuations during even minor 
hurricanes. The manufactured homes variable is mapped in Figure 4.10. These homes are 
located primarily in the central and northern areas of Pinellas County where 25 percent to 
50 percent of the housing units are designated as mobile homes by the U.S. Census as 
shown in Figure 4.11. These areas will definitely need to evacuate during a major 
hurricane and the evacuation strategy must address the people living in these homes.  
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Figure 4.1 Social Vulnerability Evacuation Assistance Index per Census Tract 
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Figure 4.2 SVEAI: Poverty Index per Census Tract 
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Figure 4.3 SVEAI: No Telephone Index per Census Tract 
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Figure 4.4 SVEAI: No Vehicle Index per Census Tract 
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Figure 4.5 SVEAI: Disabled Index per Census Tract 
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Figure 4.6 SVEAI: Institutionalized Population in Group Quarters Index per Census Tract 
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Figure 4.7 SVEAI: Population Under Age 5 Index per Census Tract 
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Figure 4.8 SVEAI: Population Over 85 Index per Census Tract 
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Figure 4.9 SVEAI: Single Parent Population Index per Census Tract 
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Figure 4.10 SVEAI: Manufactured Homes Index per Census Tract 
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Figure 4.11 Percentage of Mobile Homes per Census Tract 

0 2 4 6 8 101
Miles
Source: 2000 U.S. Census
Percentage of 
Mobile Homes
0% - 5%
5.1% - 15%
15.1% - 25%
25.1% - 50%
50.1% - 66%
 
 
 
 
 80 
Evacuation Vulnerability Index (EVI) 
 Based on the map of the EVI in Figure 4.12, the population of western Pinellas 
County is most vulnerable to traffic problems during an evacuation. There are two areas 
in particular that are the most vulnerable within the county. 
Households in the southwest census tracts are identified as vulnerable because of 
both high Evacuation Route Intersection Load and Evacuation Distance values, mapped 
in Figures 4.13 and 4.14, respectively. Here, the households will not only have to travel 
the greatest distance to evacuate when compared with the rest of Pinellas County, but are 
also most vulnerable to traffic congestion based on the Evacuation Route Intersection 
Load variable. 
The other area with high evacuation vulnerability values is along the northern 
coast. While the tracts do not have high Evacuation Distance values like the southwest, 
there are high Evacuation Route Intersection Load values.  
The results of the Evacuation Vulnerability Index are especially interesting when 
compared with the SVEAI map, described earlier. While areas identified as socially 
vulnerable are located primarily in southeastern Pinellas County, areas that may 
experience evacuation difficulty due to the condition of the evacuation routes are more 
widespread. Traffic management can be directed to specific evacuation routes (based on 
the EVI based on the map) in Figure 4.15.  
Spatial resolution is an important factor that affects the results of the EVI. As 
described earlier, the indices are mapped at the census tract level. Performing this 
analysis at a spatial resolution of greater precision, such as the census block group or 
census block level will produce more detailed maps of the EVI. Furthermore, including 
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all of the roads in Pinellas County, and perhaps a road network with greater detail, will 
allow for more detailed analysis of evacuation vulnerability in relation to transportation.  
Figure 4.12 Evacuation Vulnerability Index 
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Figure 4.13 EVI: Evacuation Route Intersection Load  
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Figure 4.14 EVI: Evacuation Distance 
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Figure 4.15 Evacuation Vulnerability Index and Evacuation Routes 
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Hurricane Loss Estimation Index (HLEI) 
 The following section summarizes the results of the Hurricane Loss 
Estimation Index compiled separately for the 1,000 year and 100 year hurricanes 
generated by HAZUS-MH. These two hurricanes were selected because they have 
different probabilities of occurrence, intensities, and trajectories. The indices compiled 
with these hurricanes are important in locating where severe damages will likely occur 
from specific hurricanes. Locating areas that are likely to suffer severe damage is of 
course necessary for determining the areas that need to be evacuated. Compiling the 
HLEI with the two HAZUS-MH generated hurricanes allows for loss estimates based on 
probability of occurrence, and examination of the spatial distribution of damages 
depending on the parameters of a hurricane. 
 
1,000 Year Hurricane 
 The entire county will suffer severe losses during the 1,000 year event. The areas 
that are not be exposed to category four storm surge will experience very high winds in 
excess of 150 miles per hour resulting in wind damage, mapped in Figure 4.16.  
 The Hurricane Loss Estimation Index is mapped in Figure 4.17. The coastal areas 
of Pinellas County are most vulnerable from the 1,000 year event particularly because of 
storm surge. The high scores in the storm surge exposure index mapped in Figure 4.18 
represent the large number of households in southeast Pinellas County that will be 
flooded by storm surge. The east coast of the county bordering Tampa Bay will also 
experience the strongest winds from the 1,000 year event, with estimates that peak gusts 
will exceed 160 miles per hour. However, because HAZUS-MH does not currently model 
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storm surge, the loss estimates from the 1,000 year hurricane winds and rainfall are 
greatest on the west coast of the county which is closest to the track of the hurricane. 
 The census tracts with the highest values of the At Least Severe Residential Home 
Damage Index, mapped in Figure 4.19, are located along the west coast of the county. 
Even thought the highest values of this index are along the coast, residential homes in the 
remainder of the county have high damage probabilities. There is at least a forty to sixty 
percent chance that homes will be severely damaged or completely destroyed in 62 
percent of the census tracts in the county as mapped in Figure 4.20. 
 The displaced households variable is calculated by HAZUS-MH as the number of 
households that will be displaced for at least 30 days (FEMA 2005). This variable can aid 
in not only identifying high loss areas but also in recovery measures. For example, 
temporary trailers can be brought in to provide shelter. The Displaced Household Index 
mapped in Figure 4.21 has a similar pattern as the At Least Severe Residential Home 
Damage Index. Coastal areas will experience the greatest number of displaced 
households because of coastal flooding from storm surge, but the 1,000 year hurricane 
will also displace a significant number of households along the west coast of Pinellas 
County. Households in this area will be displaced because of wind damage and rainfall 
because storm surge, mapped in Figure 4.22 does not travel as far inland as it does on the 
east coast of the county. It is important to note that the east coast of the county is 
vulnerable to storm surge and the number of households displaced will be greater than the 
HAZUS-MH results. 
 The Public Shelter Index is mapped in Figure 4.23. This map is similar to the 
displaced households index map because the number of households that HAZUS-MH 
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estimates will seek public shelters is dependent on the number of displaced households. 
There is a high concentration of these shelter seeking households in southeast Pinellas 
County. This is the same area identified by the SVEAI as being highly vulnerable. This is 
logical since HAZUS-MH identifies social groups such as the poor may need to evacuate 
to a public shelter because they have nowhere else to go.  
 The results of this HLEI show how it is necessary to continually update the 
evacuation strategy and evacuation planning zones, mapped in Figure 4.24 as loss 
modeling improves. 
Figure 4.16 Peak Wind Gusts of the HAZUS-MH 1,000 Year Hurricane 
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Figure 4.17 Hurricane Loss Estimation Index 1,000 Year Event 
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Figure 4.18 1,000 Year HLEI: Households Exposed to Category 4 Hurricane Storm Surge 
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Figure 4.19 1,000 Year HLEI: At Least Severe Damage to Residential Homes 


0 2 4 6 8 101
Miles
At Least Severe
Home Damage Index
1,000 Year
Hurricane Track
0.41 - 0.52
0.53 - 0.55
0.56 - 0.62
0.63 - 0.69
0.70 - 0.80
 
 
 
 91 
Figure 4.20 Probability of At Least Severe Damage to Residential Homes 1,000 Year Hurricane 
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Figure 4.21 1,000 Year HLEI: Displaced Households 
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Figure 4.22 Category 4 Hurricane Storm Surge 
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Figure 4.23 1,000 Year HLEI: Households with Short Term Public Shelter Needs  
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Figure 4.24 Pinellas County Emergency Management Evacuation Planning Zones 
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100 Year Hurricane 
 
The HLEI was computed using the loss estimates of the 100 year hurricane to 
examine the results of a hurricane with a lesser intensity and different track than the 
1,000 year hurricane. The 100 year event is a category two hurricane with peak gust 
winds ranging from 114 to 124 miles per hour as mapped in Figure 4.25. The hurricane 
eye makes landfall on south Pinellas County. This hurricane has a northwest trajectory as 
opposed to the 1,000 year hurricane described earlier which has a north northeast 
trajectory. Storm surge, mapped in Figure 4.26, representing category one and two 
hurricanes, as well as tropical storm surge, was computed into the HELI. This 
computation used the same method described in the HELI computation of the 1,000 year 
hurricane. 
The estimated loss from this hurricane is most severe along the coast, especially 
on the east side of the county. This area is exposed to the most intensive part of a 
hurricane, the front right quadrant, and will experience the greatest peak gust winds along 
with storm surge. Again, Figure 4.26 shows category two storm surge that inundates the 
county along upper Tampa Bay. 
The areas with the highest HLEI values mapped in Figure 4.27 are those areas 
that will suffer from storm surge. In context to evacuation, households in these coastal 
areas will need to evacuate. In comparison to the 1,000 year event, the inland areas will 
not experience a significant degree of damage. For example, the map of the At Least 
Severe Damage Index in Figure 4.28 shows that the highest values are 0.11 out of a 
possible 1.0. This damage estimate is low when comparing this index to that of the 1,000 
Year HLEI where the values range from 0.41 to 0.80. 
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Figure 4.25 Peak Gust Winds HAZUS-MH 100 Year Hurricane 
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Figure 4.26 Category 2 Storm Surge 
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Figure 4.27 Hurricane Loss Estimation Index 100 Year Event 
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Figure 4.28 100 Year HLEI: At Least Severe Residential Home Damage 
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Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index (HEVI) 
The HEVI is the sum of the SVEAI, EVI, and the HLEI. The HEVI is calculated 
twice using the HLEI for the 100 year and 1,000 year hurricanes. Again, these two 
hurricanes were selected because they have different probabilities of occurrence, 
intensities, and trajectories. Compiling the HEVI with the HLE indices of the 1,000 year 
and 100 year hurricanes is important in locating areas where severe losses will be 
suffered and examining the spatial distribution of damage based on these hurricanes. The 
final map of the Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index allows for the examination of 
where evacuation orders and resources need to be directed. 
In this section, the results of the Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index for 
each respective hurricane are discussed. Then, the variability of results when weighting 
coefficients are applied to the three components of the HEVI is explained.  
 
Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index: 1,000 Year Hurricane 
 The 1,000 year event is a category four hurricane, based on the peak gust wind 
speeds over Pinellas County. A HEVI is calculated for this event because it represents a 
worse case scenario for the county, as explained earlier. This hurricane does not make 
landfall on Pinellas County, however the high winds, rainfall, and storm surge generated 
by this hurricane would result in extensive damages according to the loss estimates of 
HAZUS-MH. 
 The map in Figure 4.29 shows high HEV values in southern Pinellas County and 
the coastal areas. Tracts with high values in the southeast are attributable to the Hurricane 
Loss Estimate and Social Vulnerability for Evacuation Assistance Indices. As discussed 
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earlier, the most vulnerable social groups reside primarily in the southeast of the county, 
the majority of the county will be able to mentally and physically cope with the stresses 
of responding to hurricanes. The southeast will also suffer from the strongest peak gust 
winds relative to the rest of the county along with the most significant flooding from 
storm surge, mapped in Figure 4.30. The high HEVI values in the remainder of the 
county are due to high HLEI and EVI values. 
Based on the results of the HLEI for the 1,000 year hurricane, it is arguable that 
the entire population of Pinellas County should evacuate. There are areas identified by 
the HAZUS-MH model that will sustain significant wind and flood damage from rainfall 
from the 1,000 year event but not suffer losses from storm surge. For example, in Figure 
4.31, there are two ‘islands’ that are not covered by the evacuation zones, but the 
probability of at least severe damage to the residential homes in these areas ranges from 
forty one to eighty percent, especially the census tracts highlighted in dark blue along the 
coast. Figure 4.32 better shows the full map of the At Least Severe Damage Index.  
Comparing the HEVI map and the evacuation planning zones in Figure 4.33, there are 
census tracts with high values not within the evacuation planning zones. These census 
tracts have high EVI scores, mapped again in Figure 4.34. 
Mandating a countywide evacuation is difficult because of enforcement issues. 
However, advising these areas to evacuate should be considered. It is also important that 
a countywide, or at least a very large scale evacuation is planned for and resources 
allocated to deal with evacuation problems.  
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Figure 4.29 Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index 1,000 Year Hurricane  
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Figure 4.30 HAZUS-MH 1,000 Year Hurricane Peak Gust Winds and Category 4 Surge 
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Figure 4.31 At Least Severe Damage to Residential Homes & Evacuation Zones 
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Figure 4.32 HLEI 1,000: At Least Severe Damage Index 
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Figure 4.33 Comparison of Pinellas County Evacuation Planning Zones & HEVI 1,000 Year Hurricane 
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Figure 4.34 Evacuation Vulnerability Index 
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Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index: 100 Year Hurricane 
The loss estimates of the 100 year event, a category two hurricane provides more 
probable and less severe loss estimates than the 1,000 year event. This hurricane has a 
northwesterly track as it travels over Florida before impacting Pinellas County. The eye 
of the 100 year hurricane travels a northwesterly track over south Pinellas County. The 
front right quadrant, the most powerful part of an Atlantic hurricane covers a large 
portion of the Tampa Bay region. Calculating the HEVI using the loss estimations from 
this hurricane produces results similar to the 1,000 Year HEVI, Figure 4.35. Of course, 
the 100 year hurricane is of a lesser intensity than the 1,000 year event resulting in lower 
HEVI values, Table 4.2.  
Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics of 100 Year HEVI and 1,000 Year HEVI 
  
No. Tracts Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
HEVI 100 208 .41 1.23 .79 .17 
HEVI 1,000 208 .73  1.67  1.16  .19  
 
 The HEVI representing the 100 year is mapped in Figure 4.36. It is important to 
emphasize that the evacuation vulnerability component of the HEVI is based on a county 
wide evacuation rather than defined zones such as the evacuation planning zones 
delineated by the local emergency management agency. It is arguable that modeling a 
countywide evacuation is not necessary for a minor hurricane. In context to the 100 year 
hurricane, a vulnerability analysis of the evacuation system where only households in 
designated evacuation zones, mapped in Figure 4.37 are evacuated will produce different 
results when compiling the HEVI. Performing such an analysis is subject to further 
research of evacuation vulnerability modeling.   
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Figure 4.35 Comparison of HEVI 100 Year and HEVI 1,000 Year. 
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Figure 4.36 Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index 100 Year Hurricane  
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Figure 4.37 Evacuation Planning Zones 
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Index Weighting 
As explained in the methodology, the HEVI is the calculated as the sum of the 
three indices (SVEAI, EVI, HLEI). This approach is straight forward. However using a 
different equation to calculate the HEVI will produce different results. Further research 
and testing is necessary to examine the variability of modeled results by calculating the 
indices using different equations. However, this section examines the results of the HEVI 
change when applying a weight to each of the three indices in the calculation of the 
HEVI. This was done three separate times, doubling the value of one of the three indices 
in each calculation. An example equation of this weighting scheme placing emphasis on 
the Evacuation Vulnerability Index is:  
 HEVI = (2 EVI) + SVEAI + HLEI  
Looking at the descriptive statistics in Table 4.2, the resulting HEVI values with 
the weights applied are similar, although of course greater than the Hurricane Evacuation 
Vulnerability Index in which weights are not applied. The weighted HEV Indices are 
mapped in Figures 4.38 through 4.40. While the degree of vulnerability of the tracts 
slightly varies between each of the maps, the overall pattern of Hurricane Evacuation 
Vulnerability is consistent with the map of the non-weighted HEVI, shown again in 
Figure 4.41. Looking at the distribution of values for each of the calculations, again the 
histograms in Figure 4.42 share a similar pattern. This is important because it allows the 
application of weights to the HEVI without dramatically changing the final results. A 
component of the HEVI can be accentuated but the results will still be reliable in 
identifying vulnerable areas that will need evacuation assistance. 
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Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics of Weighted HEVI 
 
  
No. of 
Tracts Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
HEVI 208 .73 1.67 1.1586 .18880 
HEVI (2 SVEAI) 208 .85 1.99 1.3371 .23399 
HEVI (2 HLEI) 208 1.05 2.35 1.6173 .26169 
HEVI (2 EVI) 208 .88 2.50 1.6803 .31516 
 
 
Figure 4.38 1,000 Year HEVI: Social Vulnerability for Evacuation Assistance 
Index values doubled. 
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Figure 4.39 1,000 Year HEVI: Hurricane Loss Estimation Index values doubled. 
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Figure 4.40 1,000 Year HEVI: Evacuation Vulnerability Index values doubled. 
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Figure 4.41 1,000 Year HEVI: Weights are not applied. 
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Figure 4.42 Distribution of HEVI values using weighting coefficients in the HEVI 
calculation.  
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Summary 
 The results of this methodology show how combining aspects of social 
vulnerability, transportation, and loss modeling can show where evacuation problems will 
most likely occur based on social and transportation factors and the degree of damage 
these areas may suffer from hurricanes. In Pinellas County, social groups that do not have 
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the resources to evacuate are located in isolated areas where losses will be severe, 
especially from storm surge. Conversely, areas where people are vulnerable to traffic 
problems are widespread. These areas, located along the west coast of Pinellas County, 
will suffer wind damage from a major hurricane traveling north along the coast. Storm 
surge however, will not be as severe as in eastern Pinellas County. 
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Chapter Five 
Conclusions 
Introduction 
This multifaceted approach to vulnerability analysis is important to 
Comprehensive Emergency Management programs because it enhances each of the four 
phases of CEM; planning, response, recovery, and mitigation. Evaluating the current 
evacuation plan in context to hurricane evacuation vulnerability can help determine if the 
plan is adequate. Resources can be allocated to assist in evacuation at highly vulnerable 
areas identified by the Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index. These areas can be 
analyzed further to determine the factors that affect vulnerability so these factors can be 
addressed to increase safety. Perhaps a particular area has a high degree of social 
vulnerability and needs transportation assistance such as busing. An area may have a high 
evacuation vulnerability score and may need additional police personnel to control traffic. 
Traffic management techniques such as contraflow, where lanes are reversed on 
highways to direct traffic flow in one direction, can be used to clear congested areas.   
For whatever reasons a place may be vulnerable, the results of this analysis are useful in 
prioritizing the locations where response measures are needed. 
 Loss modeling is important to hurricane evacuation studies because it integrates 
an element of risk into vulnerability analysis. HAZUS-MH is a valuable loss model 
because it models hurricane risk by simulating hurricane scenarios based on probability 
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of occurrence, intensity, and potential damages. Using the model results of HAZUS-MH 
in evacuation planning can aid in determining where people will need to be evacuated. 
These model results are also useful in developing mitigation to reduce future losses and 
reduce vulnerability.   
 
Conclusions 
The results of this thesis show that emergency response measures need to be 
directed at not only places that are socially vulnerable and at risk from suffering sever 
damage, but also at places where the conditions of the evacuation routes makes people 
vulnerable in evacuating. 
Pinellas County has fewer locations where social vulnerability is an issue when 
compared to the number of locations that may experience traffic problems during a 
countywide evacuation. While the county emergency management agency must provide 
assistance to vulnerable social groups living in areas such as the southeast, the entire 
county will require traffic management to decrease vulnerability during a major 
evacuation, especially if the entire county evacuates. 
  The two hurricanes modeled in this thesis generated by HAZUS-MH are 
different in probability, intensity, and trajectory. However, there are locations that are 
estimated to suffer loss from either hurricane and certainly need to be included when 
delimiting evacuation planning zones and designating roads as evacuation routes. Certain 
locations that will suffer building damage and displacement of households are also 
identified as highly vulnerable with the SVEA and EV Indices.  There are also locations 
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that may suffer losses during the 1,000 year event that are not within evacuation planning 
zones.  
It is arguable that due to the low probability of this event that countywide 
evacuation planning is not reasonable. However due to the high consequences of this 
hurricane, the loss of life that would occur by not evacuating these areas is of course 
inexcusable. It is also imperative that the term 1,000 year event be understood for what it 
is, a statistical measure derived from 150 year record of Atlantic hurricanes. While the 
probability of a hurricane with the exact characteristics (trajectory, wind speed) of the 
1,000 year event to occur is low, the impact from a hurricane with similar characteristics 
as this will be severe. Loss estimates similar to this event can be expected from a major 
hurricane traveling parallel to the coastline of Pinellas County. Again, these loss 
estimates are only as accurate as HAZUS-MH, but even with the degree of error of this 
model, the evacuation strategy can be improved by incorporating the loss estimates in 
hurricane preparation. It is also important that I note that by developing a building 
inventory to replace the default inventory that is supplied with HAZUS-MH, the accuracy 
of the modeled results can be improved.  
A hurricane such as the 100 year category two event modeled in this thesis should 
not require a major evacuation. Instead, evacuation should only need to take place in 
coastal areas. This analysis is useful in determining where evacuation assistance is 
needed. Traffic during an evacuation for a minor hurricane may be manageable; however 
there are areas in southeast Pinellas County where people may not be able to evacuate by 
their own means. It is important, as we saw in the case of Hurricane Katrina’s impact on 
New Orleans, that these people receive evacuation assistance. 
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 The Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index is a valuable tool for evacuation 
planning. Emergency management officials can use the results to assess the adequacy of 
the evacuation resources. For example, the percentage of population living within the five 
zones of the 1,000 Year Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Index (showing the 
percentage of population within each zone for each weighted index) is shown in Table 
4.3. The social characteristics of the two highest zones are shown in Table 4.4. This table 
is useful for allocating resources, such as buses, to assist people in evacuating.  
Table 4.3 Percent of County Population Living within 1,000 Year Hurricane Evacuation 
Vulnerability Zones 
Degree of Evacuation 
Vulnerability 
HEVI                  
(%) 
HEVI (2 SVEAI) 
(%) 
HEVI (2 HLEI)    
(%) 
HEVI (2 EVI)      
(%) 
Lowest 10.65 9.51 8.86 5.58 
Low  24.13 26.77 24.47 35.84 
Medium 38.15 35.03 38.95 29.43 
High 22.37 22.73 23.49 25.06 
Highest 4.69 5.96 4.22 4.09 
Total Percent 100 100 100 100 
 
 
Table 4.4 Percentage of Social Vulnerability for Evacuation Assistance Index Variables 
within Two Highest 1,000 Year Hurricane Evacuation Vulnerability Zones.  
Social Vulnerability for Evacuation Assistance 
Variable 
HEVI       
(%) 
HEVI          
(2 SVEAI)       
(%) 
HEVI            
(2 HLEI)         
(%) 
HEVI          
(2 EVI)        
(%) 
Total Population 27.06 28.69 27.71 29.15 
Occupied Housing Units 27.03 28.90 27.38 30.03 
Mobile Homes 34.24 47.95 36.36 28.58 
Population below poverty level 26.06 38.02 25.70 26.13 
Occupied Housing Units without Telephones 29.38 50.39 29.52 29.35 
Occupied Housing Units without Vehicles 31.24 42.96 30.92 31.92 
Institutionalized Population in Group Quarters 27.45 55.79 47.26 23.80 
Population ages 5 years and under 28.00 47.25 38.64 24.52 
Population ages 85 and over 33.88 35.48 33.21 34.56 
Population over age 5 with disabilities 28.72 33.59 28.03 30.46 
Single Parent Households 24.10 33.45 22.61 25.91 
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Future Analyses 
This analysis has a number of limitations that can be addressed to increase the 
spatial resolution of the model. HAZUS-MH is still a relatively new technology, 
especially the hurricane model. Increasing the spatial resolution of the hurricane model to 
the census block group or block level would enable the Hurricane Evacuation 
Vulnerability Index to be compiled at a larger scale. The demographic data is available to 
calculate the SVEAI at the census block group or block levels. 
Increasing the spatial resolution would be beneficial to the Evacuation 
Vulnerability Index because the entire road network of Pinellas County could be 
modeled. Instead of modeling only the major roads (which are typically the boundaries of 
census tracts) and the intersections with evacuation routes, the entire road network of the 
county could be modeled assigning EV scores to block groups or blocks.  
Recalling the GIS methods used in developing the framework for the Evacuation 
Vulnerability Index in Chapter Three, Theissen polygons were generated in order to 
calculate the number of households using each evacuation route intersection. This 
technique is commonly used for estimating the occurrence or quantity of a particular 
phenomenon near a point, however in context to this analysis there are drawbacks in 
using this method. There are instances in this analysis where a portion of a census tract’s 
households were assigned to an evacuation intersection where in reality those households 
would not use the intersection because of a body of water would prevent access. A 
specific GIS algorithm needs to be developed to solve this problem.  
Increasing the resolution of the road network would allow for other types of 
evacuation analyses. In particular, the evaluation of the current evacuation route system 
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as well as identifying other roads or combination of roads that could be used for 
evacuation. A road network that includes one way roads, intersections with limited 
turning options, and the number of lanes of each road could be developed. Now this 
certainly would take a great deal of time, man power, and money but it would be 
beneficial to evacuation and transportation analyses in general.  
Modeling evacuation vulnerability for hazards such as hurricanes does not have to 
be limited to evacuation routes. In this thesis, the loss estimates of the 100 year hurricane 
were low enough where a county wide evacuation is not warranted. However, coastal 
areas that would experience flooding would need to evacuate. Within this population, a 
number of people may need to seek public hurricane shelters for refuge. It is reasonable 
to argue that the access and proximity to these shelters would affect vulnerability. Thus, 
developing a model of vulnerability based on shelter availability and proximity would be 
beneficial to hurricane response. 
The evacuation vulnerability component of this analysis can be elaborated upon 
by modeling a smaller scale evacuation than the countywide scenario. This type of 
analyses would probably be more useful in context to the 100 year hurricane because 
again, a limited area would need to evacuate rather than the entire county. Compiling an 
Evacuation Vulnerability Index in context to these locations would be useful in 
determining where evacuation assistance will be needed within these evacuation zones. 
Addressing the geophysical component of this thesis, modeling the impact from 
storm surge would be more realistic with a dynamic storm surge model such as SLOSH. 
The GIS layer used in this thesis to model storm surge is based on the elevation of land 
and the degree of storm surge that can be expected from a hurricane based on intensity. 
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Storm surge is a complicated phenomenon where the height of tide and hurricane 
characteristics, for example travel direction and speed of onset, are just a number of 
factors that affect the degree of storm surge a county may experience.  
HAZUS-MH estimates losses of a greater number of types of structures than 
residential homes, used in this thesis. Damages to critical facilities such as hospitals, and 
business facilities are detrimental not only to emergency response, but also to the 
socioeconomic strength of the community. There are multiple avenues that can be 
traveled using HAZUS-MH.  
Regarding spatial scale, this vulnerability assessment is performed at the county 
level, however including neighboring counties, such as in the case of this thesis, 
Hillsborough, Pasco, and Manatee would be useful for analyzing evacuation at a regional 
scale.  This is important because the demographics of the entire Tampa Bay metropolitan 
area, as well as the conditions of the built environment, including the roadways will 
affect Pinellas County’s evacuation vulnerability. 
Finally, cognitive research of evacuation is important in enhancing this 
methodology. Many assumptions are made regarding evacuation, for example the route 
people will take to leave at risk areas. Studying people’s perceptions to evacuation 
orders, consequences of evacuating or staying home, and how people plan their own 
evacuation strategy will help understand this human element of hurricane response. 
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Appendix: Evacuation Route Intersection Load GIS Processing Flowchart 
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